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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
Accounting-Return To Be Allowed Utilities on Deferred
Tax Reserves Instituted in Connection with Accelerated
Depreciation Methods
In a rate proceeding' the Federal Power Commission allowed plain-
tiff Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., a regulated distributor of natural
gas,2 an overall return of six and one-fourth per cent on its total rate
base.3 This percentage reflected a one and one-half per cent rate of
return4 on the utility's reserve for deferred income tax while all other
assets carried a rate of 6.46 per cent.5 This reserve was instituted in
connection with tax deferred by plaintiff's use of accelerated amortiza-
tion and the liberalized method of depreciation computation.6 Plaintiff
1. Natural Gas Act § 4(e), 52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1958). This
subsection gives the Federal Power Commission power, subject to judicial review, to set
rates of natural gas companies engaged in interstate commerce. The courts recognize
the expertise of the Commission in this field and do not in any manner actually set
rates; they only review them.
2. "[F]ederal regulation in matters relating to the transportation of natural gas
and the sale thereof in interstate and foreign commerce is necessary in the public
interest." Natural Gas Act § 1(a), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1958).
3. A rate base is computed by adding a reasonable amount for working capital
to the Commission's determination of the fair value of the utility's plant and equipment.
A fair rate of return for the investor is determined by consideration of the current
rates of return to investors in private industry, the risk involved, and the need for
capital. The rate base is then multiplied by the rate of return and the resulting figure
is added to the utility's anticipated expenses to determine the gross income. Finally,
rates to consumers are fixed at the level calculated to return this gross income. Note,
69 HAnv. L. REv. 1096, 1097-98 (1956).
4. The determination of a rate of return of one and one-half per cent on the reserves
for deferred taxes was largely a matter of the Commission's judgment based on such
factors as its knowledge of the money market and the return that a utility will earn
on borrowed funds if it elects not to use liberalized depreciation and borrows money
to invest in facilities.
In support of its determination of a one and one-half per cent return the Com-
mission offered the following computation (which the author has paraphrased):
If Northern is allowed a 6.25 per cent return on its total rate base and decides to
borrow money rather than raise it by using liberalized depreciation it would probably
have to pay interest of 4.5 per cent to 5.0 per cent. Stockholders would receive a net
return of 1.25 per cent to 1.75 per cent on the borrowed money. To allow less than
1.5 per cent return on the deferred taxes would mean that the stockholders would gain
more by borrowing than by using rapid write-off methods for tax purposes. Northern
Natural Gas Co., 25 F.P.C. 431 (1961).
5. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 316 F.2d 659, 661
(D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 881 (1963).
6. Liberalized depreciation procedures are authorized by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
167. Subsection (b) provides:
"For taxable years ending after December 31, 1953 . . . [an allowance for de-
preciation may be computed] under any of the following methods:
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filed a petition for review of the rate order with the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit7 contending that
Congress in the Revenue Code of 1954 intended all the benefits of
accelerated depreciation for the taxpayer and none for the ratepayer.
8
Consequently, plaintiff urged, the rate allowed on the reserve should
be equal to that allowed on the other assets. The three-judge circuit
court set aside the Commission's rate allowance on the reserve and
ordered the Commission to allow Panhandle a full return on its de-
(1) the straight line method,
(2) the declining balance method, using a rate not exceeding twice the rate which
would have been used had the annual allowance been computed under the method
described in paragraph (1),
(3) the sum of the years-digits method, and
(4) any other consistent method ...which . ..does not, during the first two-
thirds of the useful life of the property, exceed the total of such allowances . ..
computed under ... paragraph (2)."
Accelerated amortization procedures are authorized by INT. REv. CoDE or 1954, §
168. Subsection (a) provides:
"Every person, at his election, shall be entitled to a deduction with respect to the
amortization ... of any emergency facility ... based on a period of 60 months. Such
amortization deduction shall be an amount [for each month] equal to the adjusted
basis of the facility at the end of such month divided by the number of months
(including the month for which the deduction is computed) remaining in the period."
Use of liberalized depreciation and accelerated amortization methods provides
higher expense deductions and therefore lower taxes during the early life of a given
facility. In later years lower deductions are taken and higher taxes are paid. Total
depreciation deductions over the life of a given property are the same using either
the straight-line method or a liberalized or accelerated method. The advantage provided
by these methods is that the taxpayer can defer a portion of the taxes on income during
the early life of a facility and use the money in the interval. 316 F.2d at 661. To
illustrate the most generally accepted accounting procedure: If tax expense computed
with the straight line method equals $100,000 and with a liberalized or accelerated
method the same year's tax expense equals $80,000 the accounting entries would be:
Income Tax Expense $80,000
Deferred Income Tax Expense 20,000
Reserve for Deferred Income Tax 20,000
Cash 80,000
Until the funds in the reserve account are needed to pay the taxes the utility has an
interest-free loan. The Commission has never required the reserve for deferred taxes
to be funded. Note, 69 Haav. L. REv. 1096, 1099 n.3 (1956).
Although the majority opinion states that plaintiff's reserve for deferred income tax
was composed entirely of taxes deferred under Section 167, the dissenting judge cor-
rectly points out that $6,960,095 of this $11,076,954 balance was instituted in con-
nection with Panhandles use of accelerated amortization under Section 168. 316 F.2d
at 667 (Miller, J., dissenting). Deferrals of tax from both methods are credited to the
same reserve.
7. Natural Gas Act § 19(b), 52 Stat. 831 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1958), pro-
vides for review of a Commission's decision as to rates directly to the United States court
of appeals in the circuit where the company is located or has its principal place of
business, or to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
8. Plaintiff's contention is based mainly on the interpretation of the legislative
intent underlying INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, §§ 167, 168 in City of Detroit v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 230 F.2d 810 (1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
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ferred tax reservesf On rehearing en banc, held, reversed. The con-
gressional intent underlying the tax statute was to provide incentive
for plant investment; a return of one and one-half per cent on reserves
for deferred income tax, taken with other advantages, is consistent
with this policy. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power
Commission, 316 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 881
(1963).
A rapid asset write-off procedure was first authorized in the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939 through a provision for accelerated amortization
of emergency facilities. 10 This provision allowed facilities certified by
a defense agency as essential to the war effort to be written off at the
rate of twenty per cent per year. Similar legislation was enacted in
1950." An accounting technique developed to be used in conjunction
with these statutes is known as "normalization." Under this technique
straight-line depreciation is used for financial reporting purposes, even
though the taxpayer computes his depreciation expense for tax pur-
poses by an accelerated method. With this procedure, during the,
early life of an asset the difference between the actual tax paid and
the amount which would have been paid if straight-line depreciation
had been used is credited to a reserve for deferred taxes. The cor-
responding debit is to tax expense. Subsequently, when the actual tax
expense rises above the tax computed by the use of straight-line
depreciation, the excess of the former is credited to tax expense and
the reserve for deferred tax is debited an equal amount. The taxpayer
is allowed the same total amount of depreciation on an asset; the effect
of using a rapid write-off procedure is that more depreciation is taken
in the early life of an asset, thus decreasing taxes, while later in the
life of an asset less depreciation allowance is taken and higher taxes are
paid.'2
In the case of a public utility, a reflection in the rates of the dis-
parity of tax payments over the life of an asset can be prevented if
straight-line depreciation computed for normalization purposes, rather
than accelerated depreciation, is used for the purpose of determining
current operating expenses. However, if the reserve account is allowed
the same rate of return as other assets, normalization would appear to
overcompensate for the initial reduction in taxes. Until it is necessary
to charge the reserve for the deferred taxes, the utility has an interest-
9. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, No. 16,479, D.C.
Cir., Sept. 17, 1962 (3 judges sitting).
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 124, 54 Stat. 999.
11. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 124, 54 Stat. 999, as amended, ch. 994, § 124A,
64 Stat. 939 (1950); see note 6 supra for discussion of accelerated amortization.
12. The American Institute of Accountants has approved normalization of deferred
tax payments. AccoUNTncr REsFac BurLxmN 44 (rev. 1958).
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free loan available for investment 13 and possibly a higher rate base.1 4
Opponents of "normalization" have condemned its use as being unfair
to the consumer since it has a twofold increasing effect on rates. The
argument is that the consumer is prejudiced first when the higher
tax figured on the basis of straight-line depreciation is charged as a
reimbursable expense and then again when the utility is allowed a re-
turn on the cost-free capital in the tax reserve. It is argued that there
is no present liability and that a continued use of accelerated deprecia-
tion on future acquisitions of an expanding company will preclude
arriving at a point where tax payments are subject to a net increase.
The tax is thought by these theorists to be permanently deferred, thus
no provision for its later payment need be made. A weakness of this
reasoning in so far as the charge against current operations is con-
cerned is that natural gas companies may not continue to expand at
their present rate.
5
Until 1954 the only rapid write-off method was accelerated amorti-
zation of emergency facilities. At that time section 167 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 authorized liberalized depreciation deductions
on any asset acquired or constructed by the taxpayer after December
31, 1953.16 In connection with the predecessors of the present ac-
celerated amortization statute, section 168, the Federal Power Com-
mission decreed in 1953 that pipeline companies would be allowed
both to charge current operations with a normalization charge and to
earn a return on the reserve created incident to such a charge.' The
13. See Priest, What Should Commissions Regulating Public Utilities Do About
Accelerated Amortization?, 39 VA. L. REV. 579, 582 (1953).
14. In determining the fair value to be placed on the facilities to be included in a
company's rate base all regulatory agencies do not use the more common technique of
deducting from the original cost of an asset its accumulated reserve for depreciation
computed under the straight-line method. Some agencies use current cost of repro-
duction less "observed depreciation," which is determined by a physical appraisal of the
facilities. See Note, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1096, 1097 (1956). If this latter method is used
the fair value of an asset could be determined to be more than its original cost less
its accumulated straight-line depreciation. The inclusion of this "fair value" figure
in the rate base along with the reserve for deferred taxes which is related to the asset
will result in the company's enlarging its rate base. Even if the reserve is not in-
cluded in the rate base normalization of the tax payments results in the acquisition
of assets by a company-either cash or plant purchased with the cash. These new
assets acquired by the company enlarge its rate base. When assets are valued above
original cost less accumulated straight-line depreciation, the inclusion of the deferred
tax reserves in the rate magnifies the enlargement.
15. See Swiren, Accelerated Depreciation Tax Benefits in Utility Rate Making, 28
U. Cm. L. REv. 629 (1961).
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167.
17. In August 1952 Panhandle petitioned the Commission for a declaratory order
as to whether it would receive all the benefits of accelerated amortization if it were
to adopt the procedure. On December 4, 1953, after expanding the proceeding into
a rule-making determination in which Panhandle participated, the Commission issued
its Opinion No. 264, Treatment of Federal Income Taxes as Affected by Accelerated
[VOL.. 17
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court in City of Detroit v. Federal Power Commission8 interpreted
the intent behind the tax statute to be in accordance with the Com-
mission's decree. The Commission and courts also have held that
reserves resulting from the use of liberalized depreciation under sec-
tion 167 should be accorded similar treatment.19 As late as 1960, the
Commission continued to adhere to these views. In Phillips Petroleum
Co.20 it reaffirmed its earlier court-approved ruling that a normaliza-
tion charge against current operations was proper and that the cor-
responding reserve for deferred taxes was properly included in the rate
base. Then, in 1961, in Northern Natural Gas Co.21 the Commission
decided to divide the benefits of rapid write-off between the utility
and the ratepaying consumer. The Commission reasoned that it was
its duty to protect the consumer under the Natural Gas Act and in so
doing to adopt ratemaldng principles which would assure the lowest
reasonable rates. Only such a rate of return was allowed on the reserve
for deferred tax as the Commission felt would provide an incentive
to the utilities to continue to use the rapid write-off procedures.
In the instant case, the three-judge United States Circuit Court
reversed the Commission's ruling embodying allowance of a less than
full return on Panhandle's tax reserves and ordered the Commission
to allow Panhandle the full benefit of normalization as related to the
reserve for deferred taxes. On rehearing, the court sitting en banc
Amortization, 12 F.P.C. 369 (1953), announcing that the utilities would receive the
same rate of return on their reserves for deferred taxes as they were allowed on their
other assets.
In its opinion the Commission said, "It is clear to us that Congress by the enactment
of this law did not intend to make gifts [lower rates] to the consumers of the public
utilities and natural gas companies ....... " Id. at 373. With this assurance
Panhandle elected to use accelerated amortization for federal income tax
purposes and constructed new facilities with funds thereby accumulated. In
April 1954 the Commission fixed rates and charges for Panhandle. In computing
these rates depreciation was figured per the straight-line method and the deferred
taxes were credited to a reserve account.
18. 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
19. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 23 F.P.C. 260 (1959), aff'd as to this issue, 281 F.2d
567 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 912 (1961); Amere Gas Util. Co., 15 F.P.C.
781 (1956).
20. 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960), aff'd sub noam. Wisconsin v. Federal Power Comm'n, 303
F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1961), aff'd, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
21. "In our view, the best solution to this problem is to divide the benefits of
liberalized depreciation between the regulated company and the taxpayer. In dividing
these benefits . . . we are guided by the principle that it is our duty to protect the
consumer, and adopt ratemaking principles which will assure the lowest possible
rates. Accordingly, we believe that the major portion of the benefits accruing from
the use of liberalized depreciation should go to the ratepayer, and the company should
be allowed only so much of the benefits accruing from the use of liberalized depreciation
as is necessary to provide it with a sufficient incentive to continue to use liberalized
depreciation, and not return to the use of straight-line depreciation in the computa-
tion of its income taxes." 25 F.P.C. 431, 439 (1961).
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divided five to four. The majority held that, giving due consideration
to established principles of regulatory law,2 a return of one and one-
half per cent on the utility's deferred tax reserves, taken with other"material advantages,"23 did give proper effect to the congressional
policy underlying the tax statute.24 First, the majority determined
that the intent of Congress was to aid economic growth through pro-
viding an incentive to industry to invest in new facilities.23 They
further determined that as to a regulated industry, the least return
which would provide this incentive was proper. They reasoned that a
less than full return on these reserves would serve to reduce rates, and
that a public utility's rates must be as low as reasonably possible
"consistent with good service and sound finance."26 The majority was
satisfied that the Commission properly reached the one and one-half
per cent figure by "careful consideration of the various factors in-
volved.... Since these evaluations are within the expert competence
of the Commission, we do not disturb the conclusions derived from
them."z7 The underlying theme of the dissenting opinion is that the
Commission and the majority did not have authority to withhold from
the taxpayer any of the incentive to investment that Congress intended
to bestow.28
This court has reached a desirable result in dividing between the
taxpayer and the ratepayer the benefits which are derived from the
22. "[F]undamental principles of rate regulation . . . require rates to reflect actual
cost of capital." 316 F.2d at 662. "The recovered funds were acquired at no cost
to the company." Id. at 663.
23. "The other 'material advantages' which the Commission found would result from
'the use of deferred taxes to supply a portion of the company's capital requirements,'
are as follows: The substantial sums involved are readily available without resort to
the market, and such additions to capital serve to reduce the company's debt ratio.
The acquisition of plant by use of deferred taxes provides additional security not sub-
ject to lien on which new loans can be based, perhaps at lower interest rates than would
otherwise be possible. Furthermore, deferred tax funds accumulated between rate
cases and invested in plant may, during that period, increase the company's earnings.
Finally, the accumulation of deferred taxes increases the company's funds available for
expansion without issuing additional common stock." Id. at 662 n.5.
24. "Since there is no indication that Congress intended to bestow upon the pro-
ducers qua producers any benefits beyond those necessary to provide incentives to
investment, we conclude that, if a return of 1.5 per cent taken with the other ad-
vantages does provide such incentive, the Commission's decision would be consistent
with the congressional policy underlying the tax statute." Id. at 663.
25. "Congress permitted acceleration in the speed of the tax-free recovery of costs
[because it considered this] of critical importance in the decision of management to
incur [such] risks." Id. at 662.
26. Id. at 663.
27. Ibid.
28. "My point . . . is that the Commission and the majority of this court do not
have authority to decide that, although Congress offered unequivocally a definite
benefit to encourage taxpayers to modernize and expand their facilities, the same result
may be achieved by offering only a part-indeed, a small part-of the designated benefit
to regulated companies." Id. at 674 (Miller, J., dissenting).
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former's use of rapid write-off procedures. It is undisputed that Con-
gress enacted these procedures to provide an investment incentive for
industry. The error of earlier decisions and of the dissenting opinion
was their failure to balance this congressional intent with principles
of regulatory law so that a result would be reached which would give
effect to both. These principles include the requirement that a public
utility must operate as economically as reasonably possible with the
results of its economy flowing to the consumers by way of lower
rates. An implication of this requirement is that rates to consumers
must reflect a company's total investment including its cost of capital.
The court correctly reasoned that some return had to be allowed on
the tax reserve to provide an incentive to investment. However, since
the capital in the reserve account cost the utility nothing, this return
should be no higher than that necessary to effectuate the congressional
intent. This court gave no opinion on whether it would be within the
Commission's discretionary power to deny the utilities any return
on the reserves and to require them to use accelerated depreciation.30
Unless the other "material advantages"3' accruing to the taxpayer from
the use of the statutes are extraordinarily material it seems that such
action would not give effect to the congressional intent underlying
the statutes and thus would be an abuse of discretion. A statement
that this one and one-half per cent return, taken with other advantages
accruing to the utility, will give effect to the intent of Congress to
provide an investment incentive to industry must be qualified. Only
the passage of time will reveal whether utilities will continue to use
the rapid write-off methods and normalization to generate reserve
funds for investment. 2
An additional effect of this decision is the support it gives to the
process of "normalization" in regulatory accounting. However, op-
ponents of normalization have won a partial victory through this
decision, since some of the burden on the consumer has been alleviated
by the reduction in the rate of return on the tax reserves. This re-
duction eliminates some incentive to invest, but in those cases in
which regulatory agencies have the power to compel utilities under
their jurisdiction to invest no investment incentive is needed. Congress
apparently failed to consider when the statutes were enacted that
certain utilities did not need the investment incentive of accelerated
29. 316 F.2d at 663. See Swiren, supra note 15, at 632.
30. 316 F.2d at 661.
31. See note 23 supra.
32. The Federal Power Commission has begun a study to determine the propriety
of the one and one-half per cent rate of return on the tax reserves. 32 U.S.L. WEEK
3153 (Oct. 22, 1963).
33. See text discussion of objections to normalization at p. 278. supra.
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depreciation, but in the "investment credit" statute of 1962 3 recog-
nition was given to this fact, as certain "public utility property" was
allowed a substantially smaller percentage of credit against tax than
that allowed to other property.3 The provisions with respect to
"public utility property" did not affect natural gas pipeline companies
such as Panhandle which are allowed the same credit as unregulated
companies. 36 The fact that some regulated companies are required to
pass on to their consumers some of the benefits of the investment
incentive statutes37 has concerned Congress.m  In the tax bill recently
passed by the House of Representatives a provision was included in
which Congress declared its intent that no company that receives the
same credit as an unregulated company should be compelled by any
federal regulatory agency to "use .. .any credit against tax allowed
by the [investment credit statute] to reduce such taxpayer's Federal
income taxes for the purpose of establishing the cost of service of the
taxpayer."m If Congress intends to maximize the benefits to utilities
of the tax savings arising from the use of this statute it has not gone
far enough with this provision. Nothing is said to prevent regulatory
agencies from reducing rates to consumers by allowing a less than
full return on the reserves instituted in connection with the use of the
investment credit. When Congress enacted accelerated depreciation
34. The "investment credit" statute allows a credit against federal income taxes of
seven per cent of the cost of certain depreciable assets acquired and placed in service
after 1961. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 38, 46(2).
35. "[P]roperty used predominantly in the trade or business of the furnishing or
sale of-
(i) electrical energy, water, or sewage disposal services,
(ii) gas through a local distribution system,
(iii) telephone service, or
(iv) telegraph service by means of domestic telegraph operations ...if the rates"
are established by a regulatory agency, receives only a three per cent credit for tax
purposes. INT. BEv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 38, 46(c)(3).
36. Natural gas pipelines, railroads, airlines, truck and bus operators, and other
types of public carriers receive an investment credit of seven per cent on their in-
vestment in qualified property. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1963).
37. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 38, 167, 168.
38. The instant case has decided that the benefits of accelerated amortization should
be shared by the taxpayer with the consumer. It follows that benefits accruing from
the "investment credit" statute should also be shared. The Federal Communications
Commission has ruled "that the proper accounting treatment with respect to the
investment tax credit .. .is to account for it as a reduction in income taxes and
let such reduction flow through to operating income." Order FCC 63-744 38445 (1963).
The adoption of this procedure passes the full benefit on to the consumer immediately.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Accounting Principles Board
has advocated "normalization" to reflect the credit in net income spread over the life
of the asset. Opinion No. 2, "Accounting for the 'Investment Credit.'" This seems to
be the better approach as the credit should be matched to the life of the investment
which gave rise to the credit. Under either view the consumer shares in the benefits
of the statutes.
39. H.R. 8363, § 202(e)2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
[VOL. 17
RECENT CASES
statutes it apparently did not consider that regulatory agencies would
allow utilities to normalize the deferred taxes arising from the use of
the statutes and to include the reserves instituted in connection with
the process in the utilities' rate bases.4° This practice was approved in
the City of Detroit case.41 Neither did Congress consider that the tax
reserves would not be allowed a full rate of return. The instant case
for the first time before a federal court raised the question of the rate
of return allowable on the reserves. Since City of Detroit approved
normalization and the inclusion of deferred tax reserves in the rate
base, and since the instant case has allowed a less than full return on
such reserves, Congress should be aware of these procedures which
reduce the investment incentive of the statutes.42 However, in the
pending tax bill Congress has taken no action to prevent regulatory
agencies from allowing a less than full return on deferred tax reserves.
Apparently Congress has not considered that an allowance of a less
than full return on reserves instituted in connection with the "invest-
ment credit" statute would eliminate some of the investment incentive
directed by this statute to the utilities.
Conflict of Laws-Torts-Repudiation of
Place of Injury Rule
In a New York case, plaintiff was an automobile guest of the
defendant host on a weekend trip to Canada. Both were residents of
New York. While driving in the Province of Ontario, the host lost
control of the car; plaintiff was seriously injured when the car
40. The use of the accounting procedure outlined in paragraph 13 of Accounting
Research Bulletin No. 43, ch. 9(c), would result in there being no deferred tax reserve
to include in the rate base where "book value" (i.e., cost less accumulated depreciation)
of assets is the asset value figure included in the rate base. Under this procedure a
charge for additional depreciation is made to the depreciation expense account with the
related credit being made to accumulated depreciation. This procedure recognizes
the loss of future deductibility of the cost of assets for income tax purposes but provides
no separate reserve for deferred taxes. The answer to a utility's claim to include deferred
tax reserves in its rate base would simply be that there are no deferred tax reserves.
41. Supra note 18.
42. Since the deferred tax reserves are similar to loans, one of the strong arguments
for their inclusion in the rate base is that since borrowed money is included in the rate
base the tax reserves should also be included. The tax savings arising from the "in-
vestment credit" statute cannot be analogized to a loan since they are never to be
repaid. Thus these tax savings really amount to cost-free capital. A strong argument can
be made that capital which cost the utility nothing should not be included in the rate
base. However, if the tax savings are not included in the rate base the question is
raised whether effect is given to the congressional intent behind the tax statute of




struck a stone wall. In New York, plaintiff's action for negligence
against the host' was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that
although New York law permitted an automobile guest to recover
from his host,2 the law of the place where the tort occurred 3 governed
the action, and an Ontario statute4 barred recovery of damages by
an automobile guest against his host. The appellate division affirmed
the judgment. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York, held,
reversed. The law to be applied in resolving each substantive issue in
a tort action is the law of the state having the most substantial
interest in the particular issue presented. Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
In a New Hampshire case, a wife filed suit against her husband in
New Hampshire, the state of the spouses' domicile, to recover for
injuries sustained in a Massachusetts -accident resulting from alleged
gross negligence of her husband in operating a motor vehicle in which
she was a passenger. Although New Hampshire law allows one
spouse to bring a tort action against the other,5 the lower court
dismissed the action on the ground that the law of the place where
the tort occurred governed and there was no tort action in favor
of one spouse against the other under Massachusetts law.6 On appeal,
held, reversed. The question of marital immunity from tort liability
is governed by the law of the spouses' domicile. Thompson v. Thomp-
son, 193 A.2d 439 (N.H. 1963).
In the United States a large majority of the courts have followed
a general conflict of laws rule that the law of the place of injury
governs the substantive rights of parties in a tort action.7 The place-
of-injury rule was adopted by the first Restatement of Conflict of
Laws.8 Thus, the liability of a motorist to his guest has generally
been determined by application of the place-of-injury rule with con-
1. The host died after the suit was commenced and his executrix was substituted
as defendant.
2. Higgins v. Mason, 255 N.Y. 104, 174 N.E. 77 (1930).
3. Where the state in which the injury occurred is not the same as the state
where the wrongful acts occurred, the law of the state where the injury occurred is
generally applied. Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940); Dallas
v. Whitney, 118 W. Va. 106, 188 S.E. 766 (1936).
4. Highway Traffic Act of Province of Ontario, ONTAIUO REV. STAT. c. 172, § 105(2)
(1960).
5. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blake, 94 N.H. 141, 47 A.2d 874 (1946); Gilman
v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 Atl. 657 (1915).
6. Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948).
7. "The general conflict-of-laws rule, followed by a vast majority of the States, is to
apply the law of the place of injury to the substantive rights of the parties." Richards
v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1962); GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 219 (2d
ed. 1938).
8. REsTATEm T, CONFLICT OF LAws § 378 (1934).
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sequent reference to the law of the state where the accident occurred.9
In the same manner, tort liability between spouses has most often been
determined by the rule of marital tort immunity in the state where
the injury occurred, without regard to the law of the spouses'
domicile.'0 Although New York had followed the place-of-injury rule
until the Babcock decision," the court's dissatisfaction with the rule
was evident in a previous decision involving a Massachusetts airplane
crash. In that case, the court refused to limit the amount of plain-
tiffs recovery under a provision of a Massachusetts wrongful death
statute, on the theory that the question of damages is procedural and
therefore governed by the law of the forum. 2 New Hampshire, in
the case of Gray v. Gray,13 was among the first states to apply the
place-of-injury rule to the question of marital immunity for tort;
it had previously applied the rule to other situations as well.14 The
place-of-injury rule reflects the vested rights theory of conflict of
laws,' 5 which is now discredited by many writers. 16 Widespread
criticism of the place-of-injury rule and the first Restatement's posi-
tion is based on the idea that choice of law problems should be
resolved by applying the law of the state which has the most sub-
stantial interests and connections with the particular legal issue.'
7
9. Blount v. Blount, 125 So. 2d 66 (La. Ct. App. 1960); Sharp v. Johnson, 248 Minn.
518, 80 N.W.2d 650 (1957); Naphtali v. Lafazan, 8 App. Div. 2d 22, 186 N.Y.S.2d
1010 (1959), aff'd mem., 8 N.Y.2d 1097, 171 N.E.2d 462 (1960); Estate of Bednaro-
wicz v. Vetrone, 400 Pa. 385, 162 A.2d 687 (1960); Fysken v. Fysken, 267 Wis. 542,
66 N.W.2d 150 (1954).
10. Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931); Robinson v. Gaines, 331
S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1960); Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 Atl. 508 (1934); Howard v.
Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931); Holder v. Holder, 384 P.2d 663 (Okia.
1963); Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931).
11. Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, 5 N.Y.2d 1016, 158 N.E.2d 128 (1959),
modifiing 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 177 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1958); Poplar v. Bourjois, Inc., 298
N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948); Naphtali v. Lafazan, supra note 9. But see Mertz v.
Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
12. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), held the full faith
and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States did not require application
of the Massachusetts limitation on wrongful death damages in a suit brought in New
York under the same facts as Kilberg.
13. Supra note 10.
14. See Zielinski v. Cornwell, 100 N.H. 34, 118 A.2d 734 (1955).
15. The place-of-injury rule "had its conceptual foundation in the vested rights
doctrine, namely, that a right to recover for a foreign tort owes its creation to the law
of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred and depends for its existence and extent
solely on such law." Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 477-78, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281
(1963). A discussion of the vested rights theory and other American theories of
conflict of laws is found in Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their
Role and Utility, 58 Hv. L. REv. 361 (1945).
16. Id. at 379-85; Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33
YALE LJ. 457, 479-85 (1924); Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of
Laws, 37 YL.E L.J. 468, 473-83 (1928).
17. Ford, Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws:
1963]
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Similar criticism of inflexible choice of law rules as to contracts has
led several courts in contracts cases to adopt the "center of gravity"
rule, which resolves conflict problems through a determination of
which state has the most significant relation to the particular ques-
tion. 18 In recent years there have been significant departures from
the place-of-injury rule in tort cases. In one line of cases, state dram
shop acts have given rise to liability where the plaintiff was injured
outside the state by an intoxicated motorist to whom defendant bad
served alcoholic beverages within the state, even though the state
in which the plaintiff was injured imposed no liability.19 In a group
of earlier cases, interspousal tort actions were denied in states recog-
nizing marital immunity from tort liability, even though the state
where the injury occurred did not recognize such immunity, on the
ground that interspousal tort actions were against the public policy
of the state.20 In the noted case of Haumschild v. Continental
Casualty Co.21 the court held that the question of marital immunity
for tort was governed by the law of the spouses' domicile, on the
ground that the question was one of family law. Similarly, the place-
of-injury rule has been avoided in several other cases by the device
of classifying the question presented as one of family law,22 pro-
cedural law,2 or decedents' estates law,24 and therefore, under widely
accepted conflict of laws principles, governed by choice of law rules
other than the place-of-injury rule. The Supreme Court of the United
States gave its approval of the trend away from the place-of-injury
Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 397 (1954); Morris,
The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARv. L. REv. 881 (1951); Weintraub, A Method for
Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1963).
18. Jansson v. Swedish American Line, 185 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1950); Kievit v. Loyal
Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 170 A.2d 22 (1961); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y.
155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); Boston Law Book Co. v. Hathorn, 119 Vt. 416, 127 A.2d
120 (1956). The "center of gravity" theory is also adopted by the UNIFonM COm-
MERcAL CODE § 1-105 and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 332(1)
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
19. Zucker v. Vogt, 200 F. Supp. 340 (D. Conn. 1961); Osborn v. Brochetta, 20
Conn. Sup. 163, 129 A.2d 238 (1956); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82
N.W.2d 365 (1957). Contra, Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 151, 95
N.E.2d 512 (1950).
20. Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939); Kyle v. Kyle, 210
Minn. 204, 297 N.W. 744 (1941); Mertz v. Mertz, supra note 11; Poling v. Poling, 116
W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935).
21. 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
22. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (unemancipated minors
permitted to recover from parent under law of domicile).
23. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra note 12.
24. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (survival of tort action
against decedent held governed by law of decedents domicile and not law of state




rule in Richards v. United States, ruling on the law applicable to
claims arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act.26 In response to
the dissatisfaction of the courts with the place-of-injury rule, the
American Law Institute, in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws, has abandoned the rule and has replaced it with a principle
which determines the applicable law by reference to the state having
"the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the
parties." 7 The Institute further proposes to adopt the more specific
rule that the law governing the question of family immunity from
tort liability is the law of the domicile of the family.28
In Babcock, the court recognized that New York had followed the
place-of-injury rule in the past,29 but found the rule to be a product
of the vested rights theory of conflict of laws which "ignores the
interest which jurisdictions other than that where the tort occurred
have in the resolution of particular issues."30 The court reasoned that
"justice, fairness and the best practical result" could best be achieved
by enforcing the law of the jurisdiction having the strongest interest
in the resolution of the particular question presented. 31 Applying this
principle to the case, the court found that Ontario had no interest in
denying a remedy to a New York automobile guest against his New
York host since the purpose of the Ontario statute was to protect
insurance carriers in Ontario from collusive suits.-2 New York, how-
ever, had a strong interest in the remedy available to a New York
automobile guest against his New York host.3 Furthermore, the
25. Supra note 7.
26. The Federal Tort Claims Act imposes tort liability on the federal government
"under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958). In Richards, the Supreme Court held the law
governing a claim arising under the act was the "whole law" of the place where the
acts of negligence occurred, including its conflict of laws rules. The Court based the
decision, in part, upon the consideration that the interpretation adopted would allow
federal courts to utilize flexible choice of law rules existing in states where cases arise
under the act and the act would not be tied down to an inflexible choice of law rule.
369 U.S. at 12-13.
27. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 379(1) (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1963). Important contacts to be considered in determining the state having the most
significant relationship include: "(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place
where the conduct occurred, (c) the domicile, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered." Id. § 379(2).
28. Id. § 390(g).
29. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 477, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281 (1963).
30. Ibid. Similar criticism led to dissatisfaction with mechanical contract choice of
law rules also based on the vested rights theory; these rules were abandoned in New
York in favor of the "center of gravity" rule in Auten v. Auten, supra note 18.
31. Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 29, at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283.
32. Id. at 482-83, 191 N.E.2d at 284.
33. The policy of New York to allow unrestricted recovery by an automobile guest
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court thought it more desirable that rights stemming from the host-
guest relationship remain constant in travel through different juris-
dictions.m Therefore, plaintiff's right of action was held governed in
this respect by New York law.1 The court noted that New York law
would govern in a similar case where the foreign guest statute re-
quires a showing of gross negligence. 36 The court was careful to
point out, however, that different elements of a tort claim may be
governed by the law of different jurisdictions 7 and that the jurisdic-
tion where the tort occurs almost always has a predominant interest
in questions concerning the element of due care.3 Two judges dis-
sented on the ground that the decision was a confusing alteration of
existing law not justified by public policy.3
The Thompson court found well established in New Hampshire
the rule that marital immunity from tort liability is governed by the
law of the place where the tort occurred.40 Reviewing the wisdom
of this rule, the court found that the purposes of prohibiting inter-
spousal tort actions were to prevent collusive suits against insurance
carriers and to preserve domestic harmony.41 Massachusetts has no
interest in advancing these purposes in a New Hampshire suit be-
tween New Hampshire spouses.4 New Hampshire, on the other
hand, allows interspousal tort actions without fear of collusive suits
or marital discord and has a strong interest in the policies which
govern New Hampshire suits between New Hampshire spouses.
43
The court concluded that the question of interspousal immunity from
tort liability should be determined by the law of the spouses' domicile,
since that jurisdiction has the strongest interest in the question."
However, the court stated that the law of the place where the tort
occurred governed the standard of care required of the defendant 5
against his host was indicated by the refusal of the legislature to enact a statute limiting
or denying such recovery. Ibid.
34. One reason to have rights which stem from the host-guest relationship remain
constant in multi-state travel is to enable the host to procure insurance adequate under
the applicable law and the insurer to more accurately determine the proper premium.
Id. at 483-84, 191 N.E.2d at 285. See generally Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the
Conflict of Laws-Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and
Insurable Laws," 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960).
35. Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 29, at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285. New York
imposes no restrictions on an automobile guest's recovery from his host. See note 33
supra; Higgins v. Mason, 255 N.Y. 104, 174 N.E. 77 (1930).
36. Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 29, at 484 n.14, 191 N.E.2d at 285 n.14.
37. Id. at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285.
38. Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284.
39. Id. at 485-87, 191 N.E.2d at 285-87.
40. Thompson v. Thompson, 193 A.2d 439, 440 (N.H. 1963).
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.





and therefore the defendant should be liable only for gross negligence
as required for recovery by an automobile guest against his host
under Massachusetts law.46
It is not surprising that a rule which invariably determines the law
applicable to a wide variety of tort claims arising from varied factual
'situations solely by reference to the place of injury has caused much
'dissatisfaction. Since laws are grounded in public policies which the
'state seeks to advance, a satisfactory solution of choice of law prob-
lems is not possible unless consideration is given to the policies of
competing laws and the selection of law is determined by ascertaining
the state which, in light of these policies, has the strongest interest
in the resolution of the particular issue. Babcock and Thompson
are based on a policy analysis of competing laws and therefore
represent a significant departure from -the place-of-injury rule.
Such a policy analysis is superior to the device employed by
earlier cases which classified issues into particular areas of law,
such as procedure or domestic relations, and concluded that the
place-of-injury rule, applicable only to tort issues, did not govern
the choice of law.47 Such classification is an arbitrary means of avoid-
ing the place-of-injury rule which provides a poor basis for the
prediction of future cases48 and ignores the policies of competing
laws in the same manner as the place-of-injury rule. Babcock es-
tablishes the broad principle that the elements of a tort are governed
by the law of the state having the strongest interest in the particular
question presented. Application of this principle was not difficult in
Babcock because New York clearly had the strongest interest in the
question presented. Future cases will present more difficult decisions
where more than one state has a substantial interest in the question
before the court, and the ultimate wisdom of the Babcock decision
will be determined by the resolution of these cases. Babcock is a
46. Marshall v. August, 338 Mass. 790, 155 N.E.2d 800 (1959); Motta v. Mello, 338
Mass. 170, 154 N.E.2d 364 (1958). Contrast the statement in Thompson, that the
defendant is liable only for gross negligence since the standard of care is governed
by the law of the place where the tort occurred, with the statements in Babcock that
where the defendant's exercise of due care is at issue, that question should almost
always be determined by the law of the place where the tort occurred, supra note 38,
but that in a case similar to Babcock, New York law would govern even though the
foreign guest statute requires a showing of gross negligence. Supra note 36. The
dissent in Babcock thought these statements were inconsistent. Babcock v. Jackson,
supra note 29, at 486-87, 191 N.E.2d at 287. However, the majority opinion in Babcock
indicates that what was meant was that the law of the jurisdiction where the tort
occurred should almost always control questions concerning the care exercised by the
defendant, but other relevant considerations arise where a special standard of care
is imposed as a result of a particular relationship between the parties.
47. Emery v. Emery, supra note 22; Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra note
12; Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., supra note 21.
48. For a discussion of this point see Weintraub, supra note 17, at 218-20.
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landmark case in the establishment of a broad principle of conflict of
laws which should find recognition in other jurisdictions in the
future.49 In Thompson, a narrower rule was decided, that the ques-
tion of interspousal immunity from tort liability is governed by the
law of the spouses' domicile since that state has the strongest interest
in the question. Thompson establishes a rule within the broad
principle of Babcock, which should yield to that principle where the
particular facts of a case indicate the state of domicile does not have
the strongest interest in the question of marital immunity. 0 Although
the broad principle of Babcock is implicit in Thompson, that the
Thompson court did not fully adopt the principle is apparent from
its statement that the law of Massachusetts requiring gross negligence
for recovery by an automobile guest against his host should govern
the plaintiff's action.5' Under the broad principle of Babcock, the
court should have realized that Massachusetts has no more interest
in the question whether gross negligence is required in a New Hamp-
shire suit by a New Hampshire automobile guest against his New
Hampshire host than does Massachusetts concerning the question
whether the action should be barred by marital immunity for tort.
49. The importance of the Babcock decision is reflected in a complete treatment of
the case by several authorities in Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Develop-
ment in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLum. L. REV. 1212 (1963).
50. In Haynie v. Hanson, 16 Wis. 2d 299, 114 N.W.2d 443 (1962), the state of
domicile does not seem to have had the stronger interest in the question of marital
immunity as it was there presented. There, husband and wife were involved in an
automobile accident in Wisconsin with a Wisconsin resident, while the husband was
driving. Husband and wife were residents of Illinois, which did not permit inter-
spousal tort actions. In an action in Wisconsin by the wife against the Wisconsin
resident and his Wisconsin insurance carrier, the court held defendants could not
implead the husband since the law of the state of domicile governed the question of
marital immunity and under Illinois law the husband had no underlying liability
to his wife on which contribution could be based. The case followed Haumschild v.
Continental Cas. Co., supra note 21, which classified the question of marital immunity
as one of family law and therefore held the question was governed by the law of the
spouses' domicile. Weintraub points out that in the Haynie case the policies of the
Illinois rule against interspousal tort actions, prevention of collusive suits, and marital
discord, were not applicable because the wife was not suing her husband. Weintraub,
supra note 17, at 219.
51. Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 40, at 441.
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Constitutional Law-Due Process-Juvenile Court
Proceeding a Bar to Subsequent Criminal Trial
for the Same Act
Defendant was charged with murder. Since he was sixteen years
of age, he was bound over to juvenile court pursuant to Texas
statutes.' The district attorney moved to withdraw the murder charge
in juvenile court because he feared that the state would be precluded
from trying the defendant in criminal court when he reached the age
of seventeen. This motion was denied;2 defendant was adjudged a
delinquent and sentenced to reform school. Upon reaching seventeen,
defendant was indicted for murder and convicted in criminal court; he
was given a sentence of seven years, with credit allowed for the time
spent in reform school.3 On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals,4 held, reversed. To adjudge one accused of a crime a de-
linquent in juvenile court renders a later criminal prosecution for the
same offense a violation of fundamental fairness and a deprivation of
liberty without due process, prohibited by the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution.5 Garza v. State, 369 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1963).
The application to juvenile court proceedings of the traditional con-
stitutional guarantees applied to criminal trials, such as right to coun-
sel,6 right to protection against self-incrimination,7 right to bail,8 right
1. "The term 'delinquent child' means . . . any male person over the age of ten
(10) years and under the age of seventeen (17) years: (a) who violates any penal
law of this state of the grade of felony .. " TEX. RE V. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1,
§ 3 (1950); "The Juvenile Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings
governing any delinquent child .. ." TEx. BRv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 5 (1950).
2. State v. Garza, 358 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
3. "Provided that in all criminal cases the judge of the court in which defendant was
convicted may, within his discretion, give the defendant credit on his sentence for the
time . . . defendant has spent in jail in said cause, from time of arrest and confinement
until his sentence by the trial court." TEx. CODE CmIv. PRoc. ANN. art. 768 (Supp.
1962).
4. Texas has separate civil and criminal courts; the Court of Criminal Appeals is
the court of last resort in the criminal system, and the Supreme Court is the highest in
the civil system.
5. In addition to the due process argument the defendant pleaded that the state's
actions in having two trials constituted double jeopardy under both the Texas and
federal constitutions. However, the court did not think it necessary to decide this point.
6. In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955) (right to counsel allowed). Contra,
People v. Dotson, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956).
7. Hampton v. State, 167 Ala. 73, 52 So. 659 (1910) (privilege against self-
incrimination applied). Contra, In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523, cert. denied,
348 U.S. 973 (1954); People v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955).
8. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960) (right to bail allowed).
Contra, In re Holmes, supra note 7.
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to trial by jury,9 right to confrontation of witnesses, 10 and the pro-
hibition against being placed twice in jeopardy," has been a subject
of divergent views in the courts. The weight of authority is that in a
state juvenile proceeding the accused is not entitled as a matter of
right to the above.' 2 The basic theory underlying this denial of
protection is that the state as parens patriae is taking the child into
custody, not for punishment but for the purpose of rehabilitation. 3
Thus, the juvenile hearing is considered to be civil in nature rather
than criminal. It is reasoned that the state as parens patriae is not
required to provide the protection required in a criminal trial. The
juvenile trial should be informal with relaxed rules of evidence 14 and
standards of proof,15 as this will best serve the needs of the child. The
result of this reasoning has been the holding that jeopardy cannot
attach since the juvenile is not convicted of, or charged with, any
crime.' 6 The parens patriae theory Las been challenged by way of
strongly worded dissents in several recent cases. 17 "What a child
9. People v. Fifield, supra note 7 (no right to jury trial).
10. In re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954) (right to confrontation of
witnesses applied). Contra, In re Holmes, supra note 7.
11. United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899 (D.D.C. 1958), ret'd on other
grounds, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (double jeopardy prohibition applied). Contra,
Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914 (1958).
12. See, e.g., People v. Fifield, supra note 7; People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d
140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953); Moquin v. State, supra note 11; State v. Smith, 25 N.W.2d
270 (N.D. 1946); In re Holmes, supra note 7; Hultin v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 425,
351 S.W.2d 929 (1961). Contra, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, supra note 11;
Garza v. State, 369 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963). See generally Annot., 48
A.L.R.2d 668 (1956); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1128 (1955).
13. Breitenbach, Due Process of Law for Youthful Offenders, 32 CAL. ST. B.J. 665,
668 (1957); Yehile, The Role of the Juvenile Court in Our Legal System, 41 MAnQ.
L. REv. 284 (1957).
14. In re Holmes, supra note 7, at 606, 109 A.2d at 526.
15. Ibid.
16. "The rule of double jeopardy is applicable only where the first prosecution in-
volves a trial before a criminal court or at least a court empowered to impose punish-
ment . . . . The question to be decided is whether the hearing before the Juvenile
Court ... subjected the defendant to the risk of these penalties. We answer this
question in the negative. The juvenile act does not contemplate the punishment of
children .... The act contemplates an attempt to correct and rehabilitate." Moquin v.
State, supra note 11, at 528, 140 A.2d at 916. "The proceedings in such a court are
not in the nature of a criminal trial but constitute merely a civil inquiry or action
looking to the treatment, reformation and rehabilitation of the minor child." In re
Holmes, supra note 7, at 603, 109 A.2d at 525. "No adjudication upon the status of any
child in the jurisdiction of the court shall operate to impose any civil disabilities .. .
nor shall any child be deemed a criminal by reason of such adjudication, nor shall such
adjudication be deemed a conviction. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, §
13(3) (1950).
17. People v. Dotson, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 229 P.2d 875, 880 (1956); Moquin v. State,
supra note 11, at 531, 140 A.2d at 918; In re Holmes, supra note 7, at 610, 109 A.2d
at 528; Martinez v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 443, 449, 350 S.W.2d 929, 932 (1961).
Wigmore questions whether some of these reformations of the rules of evidence have
not gone too far. 5 WiGooRE, EvIENzcE § 1400 (3d ed. 1940).
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charged with crime is entitled to, is justice not a parens patriae .... 8
However, prior to the present decision no state court had rejected the
parens patriae theory and the results which flow from it.19 Only in
the federal courts, with the juvenile charged with a federal offense,
has he been given the protection applicable to criminal proceedings.3
In the instant case the court relied upon the fundamental fairness
test of the fourteenth amendment to determine whether the second
trial deprived the defendant of his liberty without the requisite due
process. The court reasoned that when the state by judicial proceed-
ings in a juvenile court deprives a person of his liberty by incarcerating
him in a state reform school, it cannot then further deprive him of his
liberty for the same act in a later criminal trial without violating the
defendant's constitutional right to due process. The court did not
specifically decide the question of double jeopardy nor whether the
juvenile court is a regular criminal court.2' The court did, however,
recognize that the juvenile court's action deprived the defendant of
his liberty. 22
The instant case breaks with the traditional state view of juvenile
proceedings. The court appears to be correct both in principle and in
result. The doctrine of parens patriae is acceptable on the theory that
it allows the state to take action against young offenders without
attaching the lasting stigma of a criminal conviction. However, this
doctrine should not be the basis for denying constitutional rights
afforded an accused in a regular criminal trial. A juvenile court must
determine whether or not the defendant did an act which if done by
an adult would be a violation of the penal code. This determination
is one of fact, and it should be made with all the protection afforded
an adult defendant under due process, even if after this determina-
18. In re Holmes, supra note 7, at 615, 109 A.2d at 530.
19. See notes 12 and 16 supra.
20. Trimble v. Stone, supra note 8; United States v. Dickerson, supra note 11; In
re Poff, supra note 6.
21. The question of double jeopardy had been before the court in five cases in
the past three years. Hultin v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 425, 351 S.W.2d 248 (1961);
Lopez v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 552, 352 S.W.2d 106 (1961); Martinez v. State, 171
Tex. Crim. 443, 350 S.W.2d 929 (1961); Perry v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 282, 350
S.W.2d 21; Wood v. State, 171 Tex. Grim. 307, 349 S.W.2d 605 (1961). In all of
these cases the court distinguished the juvenile court charges from the criminal charges.
They avoided reaching double jeopardy by holding that the two trials were for different
acts. However, Judge Morrison, dissenting in Martinez, laid the groundwork for the
present decision when he stated that the stat&s action in that case did constitute double
jeopardy and hence a denial of the constitutional rights guaranteed to an accused. 171
Tex. Grim. at 449, 350 S.W.2d at 932.
22. In holding that the juvenile conviction did deprive the juvenile of his liberty
the court raises the strong implication that the actions of the juvenile court are some-
thing more than a civil trial under the parens patriae doctrine, as was formerly held
in Hultin v. State, supra note 21, and Dearing v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 6, 16, 204
S.W.2d 983, 989 (1947).
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tion a specific criminal conviction is not recorded against the de-
fendant and he is sentenced as a delinquent. Well meaning attempts
to modify this determination of guilt or innocence can lead to un-
conscionable results. 23 Thus, it is submitted that in any determination
of the acts which the accused youth committed, the courts should re-
quire, by the use of the test of fundamental fairness adopted in the
instant case, the protection afforded in a regular criminal trial. After
a determination of fact is made by the court, or after the juvenile
pleads guilty, then the treatment of the youth can be modified to suit
the act and the age of the youth. To require such a practice would
achieve the intent and purpose expressed by the legislatures in enact-
ing juvenile court statutes.24 Yet it would not so easily allow a youth
to be punished, because of loose procedure or a lack of full protection
in the determination of facts, for an act that he did not commit.2
23. Breitenbach, Due Process of Law for Youthful Offenders, 32 CAL. ST. B.J. 665
(1957); Diana, The Rights of Juvenile Delinquents: An Appraisal of Juvenile Court
Procedures, 47 J. Carm. L., C. & P.S. 561 (1957).
24. "The purpose of this act is to secure for each child under its jurisdiction such
care, guidance and control ... as will serve the child's welfare and the best interest of
the state ... ." TEx. Rav. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 1 (1950); "This act shall be
liberally construed to accomplish the purposes herein sought." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 2338-1, § 2 (1950).
25. The instant holding raises the possibility of one abuse. Since the prosecutor will
not be able to bring a later criminal prosecution to secure a severe punishment for a
grave felony, he may deliberately delay bringing a petition against the accused in
juvenile court until the passage of time divests that court of its jurisdiction and a
regular criminal indictment may be returned. Under the current view of the discretion
of the prosecuting officer in bringing charges this result is quite possible. The "speedy
triar' guarantees of both state and federal constitutions are "intended to prevent the
government from oppressing the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the customary administration of
justice .... " Watson v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 577, 578, 237 S.W. 298, 299 (1922).
While this guarantee is intended to prevent delay after indictment, it would seem
reasonable to apply the same requirement where the only reason for not bringing the
indictment is to secure criminal jurisdiction, and not because of any need to secure
additional proof or witnesses. Certainly the resulting effect on the defendant is the
same in either case. Most jurisdictions avoid this problem by allowing the juvenile
court to waive jurisdiction, transferring the case to the criminal court, when a
serious crime is involved. See, e.g., D. C. CoDn ANN. § 11-914 (1961). For a dis-
cussion of the need for better juvenile statutes, see Paulsen, Fairness to Juvenile
Offenders, 41 MNN. L. Ray. 547 (1957). However, until the state of Texas makes
some change in its laws, the court should extend the speedy trial guarantees of the
state and federal constitution to prevent any deliberate delay in prosecution of the
juvenile. Another possible solution of this problem is stated in Tax. Ray. STAT. ANN.
art. 2338-1, § 7 (1950): "Any person may, and any peace officer shall give to the
Judge . . . information in his possession that a child is within the provision of this
Act. . . . If either the Judge or the County Attorney shall determine that formal
jurisdiction should be acquired . . . any attorney may prepare and file in the court,
a petition alleging briefly the facts which bring said child within the provisions of this
Act .... " Thus, if the county attorney delayed the prosecution, the child himself or
his parents could bring the petition and secure the benefits provided by the juvenile
act. It would seem that once the state prosecutes either by private petition or state




Family Law-Divorce-Insanity as a Defense to Action -for
Divorce on the Ground of Cruelty
Defendant's persistent accusations of adultery allegedly were-caus-
ing injury to his wife's health.' These accusations were caused by
the defendant's insanity.2 As a result of the defendant's actions, his
wife petitioned for divorce on the ground of cruelty.3 Defendant
contended that insanity is a defense against an action for divorce on
the ground of cruelty. An order of the Probate, Divorce, and Ad-
miralty Division of the High Court of Justice dismissed the petition.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.4 On appeal to the House of Lords,
held, reversed. An objective test is applied to determine whether one
spouse has treated the other with cruelty and, therefore, proof of
insanity is not an answer to that charge. Williams v. Williams, [1963]
3 Weekly L.R. 215 (H.L.).
English case law has been in a state of confusion5 in regard to the
validity of the defense of insanity in an action for divorce on the
ground of cruelty.6 The divergence of opinion as to the relevance of
intention or mens tea as an element of cruelty has produced much of
this confusion.8 Additional confusion has resulted from the use of the
1. "For the next nine months he was at home and his conduct during that time
caused damage to his wife's health. This was caused by the voices which told him of
men up in the loft of the house and of his wife's persistent adultery. He persisted in
accusing her; if she tried to get away he would follow her about the house." Williams
v. Williams, [1963] 3 Weekly L.R. 215, 217 (H.L.).
2. "It is found as a fact on medical evidence that . . .he was certifiably insane and
the evidence suggests that this is incurable." Ibid. At the trial medical evidence was
introduced to show that the husband was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, that
he knew what he was doing when he made the accusations, but did not know they were
wrong. Id. at 216.
3. "[A] petition for divorce may be presented to the court ... on the ground that
the respondent ... (c) has since the celebration of the marriage treated the petitioner
with cruelty ...... Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, § 1, 14 Geo. 6, c. 25.
4. [1962] 3 Weekly L.R. 977 (C.A.). This is the first recorded English case in which
a petitioner has failed to get relief on some ground against a spouse who is insane.
5. Goodhart, Cruelty, Desertion and Insanity in Matrimonial Law, 79 L.Q. REv. 98
(1963).
6. "In these jurisdictions in which it is by statute made a ground for divorce,
the plaintiff's cause of action is usually predicated on the ground of insanity, and
the question of whether insanity may be relied upon as a defense to an action for
divorce on other grounds does not ordinarily arise." 19 A.L.R.2d 144, 147 (1951). See
MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESnTC RELATIONS § 84 (1931).
7. "[TIhe doctrine of mens rea, which plays such a leading part in the criminal law,
cannot be applied to the law of divorce without difficulty because mens rea is an
actual guilty mind, and not a constructive one." Goodhart, supra note 5, at 116.
8. In a perceptive analysis of the law of matrimonial cruelty, Sir Carleton Allen,
Q.C., in Matrimonial Cruelty (pts. 1-2), 73 L.Q. REv. 316, 512 (1957), described
the mental element of cruelty as "a realm of mystery." In a consideration of the
competing theories as to cruelty, Allen says, "One is the offspring of the 'doctrine of
danger.' Since the law ...is concerned only with the safety of the injured spouse,
it does not matter whether cruelty was intended or not-it will still be a menace to the
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M'Naghten rules9 as the test of insanity'0 where cruelty is held to
proceed from malignity" and the defendant interjects insanity as a
defense.'2 However, the prevailing English view has been that mental
disorder short of legal insanity is no defense, 13 but where legal in-
sanity is proved it is a valid defense.1
4
victim of it, whatever its mental origin. The other is a principle of far wider extent.
...It is the principle that a human action is not an act-in-the-law involving liability
unless it is . . . 'voluntary and manifest."' Id. at 515. (Footnotes omitted.)
9. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843); PMaKINS,
CnmiwL LAW 746 (1957).
10. The test for legal insanity requires the respondent to establish either that he
did not know the nature and quality of the acts committed or that if he did know
their nature and quality he did not know that they were wrong. Palmer v. Palmer,
[1955] P. 4 (C.A. 1922).
11. Astle v. Astle, [1939] P. 415, was the first case interpreting cruelty in the context
of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1937 and it held that acts of cruelty must be shown
to proceed from malignity. Subsequent cases followed this reasoning with the exception
of Lissack v. Lissack, [1951] P. 1 (C.A. 1950), until the recent decision by the House
of Lords in Collins v. Collins, [1963] 3 Weekly L.R. 176 (H.L.), where presence of
an intention to injure on the part of the spouse charged or proof that the conduct of the
party to be charged was aimed at the other spouse was not an essential requisite for
cruelty. Thus the objective test was substituted for the subjective consideration.
12. "[T]he onus of proving insanity under the M'Naghten Rules rests on the party
who sets up the defence." Allen, supra note 8, at 517.
13. White v. White, [1950] P. 39 (C.A. 1949). Bucknill, L.J., determined re-
spondent was not insane by application of the M'Naghten rules. He expressly left open,
without giving an opinion either way, the question as to whether insanity can be a
defense to a charge of cruelty. Asquith, L.J., held that insanity must, at all events,
not fall short of insanity as would afford a defense to a criminal charge within the
M'Naghten rules. The theory behind the majority view is illustrated by Asquith, L.J.,
who said that he was unable "to accept the view that insanity can never be a defence,
partly because that view rests on an assumption which, if valid, compels one logically
to say that no state of mind on the part of the person charged with cruelty can be
relevant to his liability, and I cannot believe that a man whose acts are completely
automatic and unconscious . . .can be guilty of 'cruelty' in respect of such acts ...."
Id. at 52. Denning, L.J., retorted with a strong dissent holding that insanity should not
be a defense to a divorce action. "[I]t seems to me that, in divorce cases, if such a
man has treated his wife with cruelty, she will be entitled to maintenance, judicial
separation, or a divorce, because there again it is not a question of punishing him but
only of giving her relief from a situation which has been rendered intolerable by his
conduct. The presence of mental disease makes this relief more, and not less, neces-
sary." Id. at 57. The court in Lissack v. Lissack, supra note 11, followed
the reasoning of Lord Justice Denning and held the defense of insanity was not
valid when used by a defendant in a divorce action. This decision was overruled by
Swan v. Swan, [1953] P. 258 (C.A.).
14. "I should have thought that it was a contradiction in terms to describe as cruel
the conduct of a person who did not know what he was doing." Swan v. Swan, supra
note 13, at 263 (C.A.) (Hobson, L.J.). Where a husband, though certified as of unsound
mind, had shown by his actions that he realized his cruel behavior was wrongful, his
defense of insanity failed as not having satisfied the M'Naghten rules. Palmer v.
Palmer, [1955] P. 4 (C.A. 1954). In another case, respondent with paranoid
schizophrenia realized her conduct was wrong; thus insanity was no defense because
it did not measure up to the degree of insanity required by the M'Naghten rules.
S. v. S., [1962] P. 133 (1961). Where respondent was suffering from a paranoid
psychosis and, in the delusional belief that petitioner was conspiring with others against
her, tormented him with accusations, the court held that although %vhen she made the
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In the United States, the rule is well settled that insanity is a valid
defense in a divorce action.'5 The rationale behind this rule is that
the marital relationship imposes "upon each spouse the duty of care
and protection of the other when in disease."16 The crux of the prob-
lem in the United States has been the method by which insanity is to
be determined. 17 The position followed by the majority of the courts18
is that no mental illness short of insanity19 as measured by the M'Nagh-
ten rules2° is an adequate defense.2' However, a strict application of
false accusations she knew what she was doing, she was not in law responsible for
them because she did not know what she was doing was wrong. (A decree was
granted, however, because she had also used violence against him, knowing that this
was wrong.) Elphinstone v. Elphinstone, [1962] P. 203. See also Allen, supra note 8,
at 512; Goodhart, supra note 5; Hall, Matrimonial Cruelty and Mens Rea, 1963 CAMB.
L.J. 104; Samuels, Cruelty and Mental Illness, 2 SOL. J. 97 (1963); 24 MODERN L.
REv. 382 (1961).
15. Many of these cases involved close factual decisions. ABANDONMENT OR DE-
SERTION: Cox v. Cox, 268 Ala. 572, 109 So. 2d 703 (1959); Storrs v. Storrs, 68 N.H.
118, 34 Ad. 672 (1894); McElroy v. McElroy, 185 Pa. Super. 78, 138 A.2d 299
(1958); Quinn v. Quinn, 169 Tenn. 173, 83 S.W.2d 269 (1935). ADuLTERY: Hadley
v. Hadley, 144 Me. 127, 65 A.2d 8 (1949); Bailey v. Bailey, 115 N.J. Eq. 565, 171
AUt. 797 (1934); Manley v. Manley, 193 Pa. Super. 252, 164 A.2d 113 (1960).
CRuELTY: Cohn v. Cohn, 85 Cal. 108, 24 Pac. 659 (1890); Tretheway v. Tretheway,
115 So. 2d 712 (Fla. App. 1959); Hilburn v. Hilburn, 210 Ga. 497, 81 S.E.2d 1
(1954); Carlson v. Carlson, 308 Il. App. 675, 32 N.E.2d 365 (1941); Bosveld v.
Bosveld, 232 Iowa 1199, 7 N.W.2d 782 (1943); Rice v. Rice, 332 Mass. 489, 125
N.E.2d 787 (1955); McIntosh v. McIntosh, 151 Miss. 78, 117 So. 352 (1928); Dunn
v. Dunn, 240 Mo. App. 87, 216 S.W.2d 141 (1948); Aurutis v. Aurutis, 140 N.Y.S.2d
365 (Sup. Ct. 1955); HeLm v. HeLm, 35 Ohio App. 408, 172 N.E. 451 (1930); Castner
v. Castner, 159 Pa. Super. 387, 48 A.2d 117 (1946); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 42 Wash. 834,
258 P.2d 1211 (1953). GRoss NEGLECT OF DuTY: Crosby v. Crosby, 186 Kan. 420, 350
P.2d 796 (1960); Lindbloom v. Lindbloom, 177 Kan. 286, 279 P.2d 243 (1955).
INDiGNrrIEs: Fossett v. Fossett, 243 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. App. 1951); Stewart v. Stewart,
171 Pa. Super. 218, 90 A.2d 402 (1952); Benjeski v. Benjeski, 150 Pa. Super. 57, 27
A.2d 266 (1942). INIuMA. TnRmsTxiEN: Tiffany v. Tiffany, 84 Iowa 122, 50 N.W.
554 (1891). SEPArATON: Dorsey v. Dorsey, 90 App. D.C. 284, 195 F.2d 567 (1952);
Wilder v. Wilder, 207 Ark. 414, 181 S.W.2d 17 (1944); Clark v. Clark, 215 La. 835, 41
So. 2d 734 (1949); Moody v. Moody, 253 N.C. 752, 117 S.E.2d 724 (1961); Lawson
v. Bennett, 240 N.C. 52, 81 S.E.2d 162 (1954). See also Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 144
(1951).
16. Tiffany v. Tiffany, supra note 15, at 555.
17. See generally 10 KAN. L. REv. 95 (1961); 18 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 321 (1961).
18. Fansler v. Fansler, 344 Mich. 569, 75 N.W.2d 1 (1956); Kanz v. Kanz, 171
Minn. 258, 213 N.W. 906 (1927); Longbottom v. Longbottom, 119 Minn. 139, 137
N.W. 387 (1912); Niedergerke v. Niedergerke, 271 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. App. 1954);
Serota v. Serota, 20 Misc. 2d 184, 186 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1959); Benjeski v. Benjeski, 150
Pa. Super. 57, 27 A.2d 266 (1942).
19. The requirements of this test are not satisfied by a showing of any one of a number
of recognized mental illnesses: Dochelli v. Dochelli, 125 Conn. 468, 6 A.2d 324 (1939)
(paranoia); Champagne v. Duplantis, 147 La. 110, 84 So. 513 (1919) (insane jeal-
ousy); Bryce v. Bryce, 229 Md. 16, 181 A.2d 455 (1962) (mental illness); Gardener v.
Gardener, 239 Mich. 306, 214 N.W. 133 (1927) (beginning dementia praecox); Schuler
v. Schuler, 290 S.W.2d 192 (Mo. App. 1956) (psycho-neurosis).
20. Cases cited supra note 19; HERzoc, MEDicAL JURISPR DENCE § 648 (1931).
21. "[lInsanity which will constitute a good defense in an action for divorce, must
be such as deprives the defendant's conduct of the element of willfulness and as
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this doctrine has been qualified to some extent by a growing dis-
satisfaction 23 with such an antiquated and irrational standard.2 4 A
Kansas courtz5 has followed a procedure similar to the Durham rule,
which permits a psychiatrist to testify as to the complete mental
condition of an accused.2 7 Other courts2 have experimented with a
"sliding scale" test that allows the degree of insanity necessary for a
valid defense to fluctuate with the seriousness of the marital offense.30
In the instant case the House of Lords in a three-to-two decision
expressly approved the view established in Lissack3l that insanity is
no defense in an action for divorce on the ground of cruelty. The
court rejected entirely "the notion that 'aiming at' the injured party or
intention to hurt on the actor's part is an essence of cruelty," 2 and
held that the test is objective as to whether the spouse charged has
treated the other with cruelty.33 The court found that the practical
difficulties to the wife of allowing insanity as a defense greatly out-
weigh the relative hardship to the husband 4 and concluded that
"practical social considerations speak strongly against insanity as a
defense for divorce."- The dissent of Lord Morris and Lord Hodson
divests the defendant of the use of his reason to the extent of his being unable to
differentiate between right and wrong, or that, if capable of so differentiating, de-
fendant must be acting by force of an irresistible impulse generated by a diseased
mind and not by volition." Willis v. Willis, 274 S.W.2d 621, 627 (Mo. App. 1954).
22. "[T]he law does not undertake to distinguish among the various degrees of
lack of control short of insanity, and select those which prevent a divorce and those
which do not." Kruse v. Kruse, 179 Md. 657, 22 A.2d 475, 478 (1941).
23. Articles cited supra note 17. One commentator has said: "It seems strange to
force the strait jacket of the M'Naghten rules on the law of divorce at a time when
they are being altered if not discarded, in the criminal law." Goodhart, supra note 5,
at 123.
24. Samuels, supra note 14, at 104.
25. Crosby v. Crosby, 186 Kan. 420, 350 P.2d 796 (1960).
26. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
27. MAcDoNALD, PsycHIATRY AND THE C numNAL 29 (1958).
28. Crosby v. Crosby, 186 Kan. 420, 350 P.2d 796 (1960); Nelson v. Nelson, 108
Ohio App. 365, 154 N.E.2d 653 (1958); Manley v. Manley, 193 Pa. Super. 252, 164
A.2d 113 (1960); Stewart v. Stewart, 171 Pa. Super. 218, 90 A.2d 402 (1952).
29. Supra note 17.
30. "Care must be taken not to confuse the mental or physical ill health which we
have held to be a defense to indignities, with the insanity which has been held in other
states, and which we here hold to be a defense to adultery. . . . [A] person because
of a mental condition may be irritable and may spontaneously say and do mean and
contemptible things. If this conduct is caused by the physical or mental condition of a
wife-defendant in a divorce action, she is excused from them on the theory that such
conduct lacks the spirit of hate, estrangement and malevolence which is the heart of
the charge of indignities." Manley v. Manley, supra note 28, at 265, 164 A.2d at 120.
31. [1951] P. 1 (C.A. 1950).
32. [1963] 3 Weekly L.R. 232 (H.L.).
33. Id. at 234.
34. Id. at 257-58.
35. Id. at 258.
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was based on the theory of recent cases6 that cruelty involves an
implication of blameworthiness 37 and thus the "adjective 'cruel' should
not be applied to one who, through disease of the mind, does not
know what he is doing is wrong."- The court was unanimous in
holding that whether insanity is or is not a defense, the M'Naghten
rules should be rejected as the test for insanity.39
English case law has been committed to the view that insanity
should be a defense in an action for divorce on grounds of cruelty,
so that the insane spouse could not be divorced for acts of cruelty
over which he had no control. As a practical matter, every such case
resulted in a divorce either because the mental illness of the spouse
did not measure up to insanity as determined by the M'Naghten rules
or on some other ground.40 This paradox has been correctly resolved
in the instant case. The Williams case firmly commits the English
courts to the basic view that the essential function of the divorce law
in this situation is to provide a remedy to the parties regardless of
what causes the matrimonial offense when the marital union is
irreparably divided. This places divorce in its proper perspective as
a protection afforded the spouse against future acts rather. than a
punishment for past ones.41 This view is worthy of consideration by
the American courts, which in the past have strictly adhered to the
view that the insane spouse should be protected at the expense of
subjecting the other spouse to future cruelty. The question whether
our courts are firmly committed to this view is raised merely by the
use of the M'Naghten rules to determine insanity. This results in a
paradoxical situation similar to that in England prior to the instant
case, where the majority of mentally ill spouses do not meet the
standards of the M'Naghten rules, and thus regardless of the view the
courts purport to follow, the divorce is granted. This has been the
practical result where the M'Naghten rules are employed. A few re-
cent cases42 have disregarded the M'Naghten rules and reinforced the
American view both in theory and in practice by allowing lesser de-
grees of insanity to suffice as a valid defense. Although a certain
degree of hardship will result from either view, it seems that the
English court is correct in giving priority to the protection of the
spouse from future cruelty, regardless of its cause.
36. Palmer v. Palmer, supra note 14; Swan v. Swan, supra note 13.
37. Williams v. Williams, supra note 32, at 245.
38. Id. at 249.
39. Id. at 224-25, 242-43, 248-49, 259.
40. Elphinstone v. Elphinstone, supra note 14.
41. There would be no justification for punishment of past cruelty if there was no
intention to perform the cruel acts. A voluntary act is necessary for the theory of
punishment for past cruelty to be applied.
42. Cases cited supra note 28.
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Labor Law-Unemployment Compensation-Status of
Laid-Off Worker Under No-Strike Clause
Appellant employer brought suit to review decisions of the Indiana
Employment Security Division Review Board awarding unemploy-
ment benefits.1 Claimant employees, while occupying a layoff status,
picketed and demonstrated against appellant. Afterwards, claimants
were recalled to work and then discharged. Appellant filed informa-
tion reports with the local office of the Board stating that the claimants
were discharged for cause because of their participation in an un-
authorized strike in violation of a no-strike clause in the collective
bargaining agreement between appellant and claimants' union.2 The
referee affirmed the opinion of the deputy of the local office that the
claimants were not discharged by appellant for "misconduct in con-
nection with his [their] work."3 On petition for review, the Board
affirmed. On appeal to the Indiana Court of Appeals, held, affirmed.
A laid-off worker who participates in an unauthorized strike and work
stoppage is not an employee, within the meaning of a no-strike clause
in a collective bargaining agreement; his discharge for such activities
is not for "misconduct in connection with his work" which will render
him ineligible to receive benefits under the Indiana Employment
Security Act. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Review Board of the
Indiana Employment Security Division, 191 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. App.),
rehearing denied, 191 N.E.2d 524 (Ind. App. 1963).
The no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement is ob-
viously of vital significance to employers, 4 unions,5 and employees.6
1. This appeal is a consolidation for review of three decisions of the Board holding
three discharged employees eligible for unemployment benefits.
2. The collective bargaining agreement provided: "There shall be no strikes, work
stoppages, or interruption or impeding of work * * *. No employee shall participate
in any such activities." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Review Bd. of the Ind.
Employment Security Div., 191 N.E.2d 32, 35 (Ind. App. 1963). The agreement also
provided that employees, while occupying a layoff status, retained their seniority rights
and rights of recall. Id. at 34.
3. The Indiana Employment Security Act provides: "An individual shall be ineligible
for waiting period or benefit rights: For the week in which he . . . has been discharged
for misconduct in connection with his work, and for all weeks subsequent thereto until
such individual has thereafter earned remuneration equal to not less than ten [10]
times his weekly benefit amount in employment ..... IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1539
(Supp. 1963).
4. "To the employer in a unionized plant, the no-strike clause is probably the most
significant provision of the collective bargaining agreement to which it is a party.
An examination of virtually every collective bargaining agreement will disclose that the
agreement is a series of concessions from the employer to the union and the em-
ployees. The only real concession running from the union and the employees to the
employer in a collective bargaining agreement is the pledge of the union and employees
to refrain from strikes, slowdowns, and other concerted interruptions of operations dur-
ing the life of the agreement. In reliance upon the no-strike clause, the unionized
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An employee who breaches the no-strike clause can be discharged for
"misconduct in connection with his work"7 and thereby be disqualified
from receiving unemployment benefits.8 Defining the word "em-
ployee" therefore becomes very important. No previous case has been
found in which a court has decided whether a laid-off worker is an
"employee," as that word is used in a no-strike clause of a collective
bargaining agreement. Two principal tests, however, have been ap-
plied in defining the word "employee": (1) the narrower common law
"control" test;9 and (2) the broader "economic reality" test.10  The
employer is enabled to plan and schedule operations and make commitments of
production and shipment to its customers. If its plant is struck, despite the existence
of a valid no-strike clause, it may resort to various remedies .. . to prevent con-
tinued violation of the agreement, punish the violators, and recoup its losses arising
out of the violation." TORFF, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 91-92 (1953).
5. "To the union, the signing of a collective bargaining agreement containing a no-
strike clause means the relinquishment of its most potent weapon for carrying out its
collective bargaining policy. Once it has signed an agreement containing a no-strike
clause, the instigation, encouragement, participation in, or direction of a strike by
it against the employer who is a party to this agreement subjects it and its members
to the possibility of severe penalties." Id. at 92.
6. "To the individual employee covered by the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement containing a no-strike clause, the no-strike clause is, of course, a restriction
upon his otherwise legal right to join with his fellow employees in a concerted cessa-
tion of work to obtain better wages or working conditions from his employer during
the life of the agreement. On the other hand, the no-strike clause could be regarded
as a protection to the individual employee in the event that control of his union fell
into the bands of an irresponsible faction or leadership which might be prone, in the
absence of a no-strike clause, to instigate sporadic or lengthy work stoppages involving
considerable loss of earnings to the employees during the term of the agreement." Ibid.
7. Id. at 100-01.
8. Sanders, Disqualification for Unemployment Insurance, 8 VAND. L. tE~v. 307,
333 (1955).
9. The control test was first applied in determining the scope of vicarious tort
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. For a historical development of
the control test, see Leidy, Salesmen as Independent Contractors, 28 MicH. L. REv.
365 (1930); Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. CM. L. REv.
501 (1935); Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 MicH. L. REv. 188
(1939); Wolfe, Determination of Employer-Employee Relationships in Social Legis-
lation, 41 CoLum. L. 1Ev. 1015 (1941). There were other tests applied but the
employer's right to control was the most important. A modem illustration of these tests
is to be found in the Restatement of Agency:
"(1) A Servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another
and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is
subject to the other's control or right to control.
"(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent
contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over
the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools,
and the place of work for the person doing the work;
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word "employee" has been defined in such legislative enactments as
the Social Security Act," workmen's compensation acts,12 the Railway
Labor Act,13 and the National Labor Relations Act. 14  In factual
situations which seem analogous to the present case two federal
courts of appeal have held that furloughed and laid-off workers were
"employees" of their former employer. In Nashville, Cincinnati & St.
Louis Ry. v. Railway Employees' Department of AFL,15 the Sixth
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and
servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business."
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENcY § 220 (1958).
10. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 127 (1944). "The word
[employee] 'is not treated by Congress as a word of art having a definite meaning
* " Rather 'it takes color from its surroundings . . . [in] the statute where it
appears' . . . and derives meaning from the context of that statute, which 'must be
read in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.'" Id. at
124. (Emphasis added.)
11. The act defines the word "employee" to be: "(1) any officer of a corporation;
or (2) any individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining
the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee .... " 64 Stat. 477
(1950), 42 U.S.C. § 410(k) (1958). Before the word "employee" was defined in
the act, the Supreme Court had reasoned that "the terms 'employment' and 'employee',
are to be construed to accomplish the purposes of the legislation." United States v.
Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 712 (1947).
12. "The term 'employee' is defined by most statutes to include every person in the
service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied." I LARsoN, THE LAw
OF WOcMEN's COMPENSATION § 43.00 (1952). It has been stated that "in construing
the legislative definition of 'employee' a measure of liberality should be indulged in, to
the end that in doubtful cases an injured workman or his dependents may not be
deprived of the benefits of the humane provisions of the compensation plan." Mc-
Dowell v. Duer, 78 Ind. App. 440, 133 N.E. 839, 841 (1922). See, e.g., Mitchell v.
Consolidated Coal Co., 195 Iowa 415, 192 N.W. 145 (1923) (coal miner quitting job,
injured while going down a manway of the mine to get his tools, was "employee");
Kiernan v. Priestedt Underpinning Co., 171 App. Div. 539, 157 N.Y.S. 900 (1916)
(worker excused from work because thought to be inebriated, injured while leaving
subway, was "employee").
13. "The term 'employee' as used herein includes every person in the service of a
carrier (subject to its continuing authority to supervise and direct the manner of
rendition of his service) who performs any work defined as that of an employee or
subordinate official in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission ..... 48
Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 151(5) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
14. "The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states other-
wise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or
in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice,
and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment
." 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1958).
15. 93 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 649 (1938), 51 HAnv. L.
REv. 1299. This case also discusses how furloughed workers have been regarded as
"employees" within the meaning of the Transportation Act, 41 Stat. 474 (1920), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(7) (1958), and the Railroad Retirement Act, 49 Stat. 967
(1935), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 215 (1958).
[VoL. 17
RECENT CASES
Circuit Court of Appeals held that furloughed workers entitled to
priority in any subsequent reemployment were "employees" within
the meaning of the Railway Labor Act 6 and therefore eligible to vote
in a forthcoming election.' 7 In North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n
v. NLRB,"8 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that laid-
off workers were "employees" within the meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act 19 and that the temporary shut-down of the em-
ployer's business did not change their employment status.
20
In the instant case the court reasoned that, since the claimants had
been determined entitled to receive and had been receiving unem-
ployment benefits prior to the work stoppage, it would be illogical
to hold that they were still occupying an employee relationship.
21
The court then noted that the only ground on which the claimants
could be discharged for "misconduct in connection with his [their]
work" would be a breach of their collective bargaining agreement.
16. See note 13 supra.
17. In determining the interpretation to be given the word "employee" the court
said: "The statute has not been judicially interpreted upon the point in issue [the
definition of the word 'employee'], and the question is one of first impression. Having in
mind, however, its beneficent purpose, the several interests of employer, employee,
and public sought to be served by encouragement of peaceful settlement of labor
disputes, and recognizing also that the aim of the statute is to preserve the craft as
the bargaining unit rather than a lesser or greater group, we see no occasion for resort
to narrow and too literal construction. The statute is in purpose, mechanism and
effect, in the highest sense remedial." 93 F.2d at 342.
18. 109 F.2d 76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 632 (1940).
19. See note 14 supra. The Board has consistently decided that the mere fact that a
laid-off worker has contractual seniority rights does not entitle him to vote. The
determinative test is whether the laid-off worker has a reasonable expectation of
reemployment in the near future. Higgins, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 797 (1955); Harris
Prods. Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1036 (1952); General Motors Corp., 92 N.L.R.B. 1752
(1951); Lima Hamilton Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 455 (1949). Workers employed seasonally,
Gerber Prods. Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1668 (1951), permanently laid-off, Gerber Plastic Co.,
110 N.L.R.B. 269 (1954); Avco Mfg. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 295 (1953), and indefinitely
laid-off, F. C. Mason Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 71 (1949), are ineligible to vote. The reason-
able expectation of reemployment is to be determined as of the date of the election.
Sangamo Elec. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1 (1954); F. B. Rogers Silver Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 1430
(1951). Those laid-off workers who have a reasonable expectation of reemployment are
deemed eligible to vote because "[they] have a reason to anticipate returning to their
work at the Company's plant. They have therefore an interest in any negotiations
toward fixing the terms of the employment of the Company's polishers and hence an
interest in determining the representatives who are to conduct these negotiations."
City Auto Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 306, 312 (1937).
20. "This shutdown and layoff was no more than a suspension of work. It was not a
termination of work. It was in accordance with long established custom. The relaiion
of employer and employee does not always depend upon continuity of actual every day
work." 109 F.2d at 82. (Emphasis added.)
21. "To hold to the contrary [that claimant appellees were employees] would, in
effect result in a concomitant holding that the award of unemployment benefits to
appellees by the local office may be subject to enquiry and the acceptance of
such benefits by appellees may be in violation of [IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1559 (1951)]
...." 191 N.E.2d at 36.
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However, the collective bargaining agreement could only be breached
by an "employee." The court then found that there was nothing in
the collective bargaining agreement to indicate that the word "em-
ployee" should be given a special or technical definition contrary to its
"common well-established meaning."22 Applying that meaning to the
instant case, the majority concluded that the claimants were not em-
ployees of the appellant and therefore "were not and could not be
guilty of 'misconduct in connection with his (their) work' in the
respect asserted by appellant.2 3 In answer to appellant's contention
that claimants retained employee status and were entitled to return to
work as a matter of law, the majority emphasized the fact that the
parts of the collective bargaining agreement relied upon by appellant
were not set forth in the appellant's original brief.2 Justice Hunter
dissented on the grounds that: (1) the claimants' participation in the
unauthorized strike and work stoppage should be construed as "mis-
conduct in connection with his [their] work" and to hold otherwise
would be to contravene both logic and justice;25 (2) the majority had
written conditions into the statute and had thereby limited and
destroyed its effect;2 (3) the National Labor Relations Board had
22. "The word here used ('employes') has a definite, well established meaning,
commonly known, and is applicable only to one who is in the present service of another
for pay at a particular time. In its accepted usage, it does not embrace one who has
at some time been, but no longer is, in the employment of another." Koch v. Wix,
108 Ind. App. 20, 25 N.E.2d 277, 279 (1940). (Emphasis added.) However, it is
not clear whether the rights of laid-off workers were involved in this decision. It would
appear that this definition was used solely to determine whether workers who had
previously quit or been discharged were "employees" within the meaning of decedent's
will.
23. 191 N.E.2d at 36.
24. "We have previously adverted to the absence in appellant's brief of the pro-
visions or parts of said bargaining agreement relied upon by appellant in this conten-
tion. We are thus deprived of measuring the actual wording at any such provisions with
the contention now projected. Said statement of appellant is a self-serving conclusion
unsupported by appropriate citation to and incorporation of the pertinent sustaining
evidence." 191 N.E.2d at 36-37.
25. "It seems intuitively obvious that the referee's decision as affirmed by the board
and majority opinion of this court have contravened logic and justice by allowing a laid-
off employee to openly defy his employer in an 'illegal' and 'wildcat' labor dispute
knowing that the employer has no choice but to fulfill the contractual obligations owed
to the employee at his (the employee's) option regardless of the scope, time and extent
of the employee's misconduct, and yet still be eligible for unemployment benefits
notwithstanding his discharge for such subsequent 'misconduct'." 191 N.E.2d at 39.
26. "However the majority in upholding the Review Board's order has held as a
matter of law that there must be (1) actual or contractual control by the employer
(2) the employee must be performing services for his employer and (3) receiving
pay for the work performed, and that there must be a concurrence of all of the above
facts with 'misconduct' in point of time. It seems apparent that the Board of Review
in its findings and order have, in reaching such a conclusion, written conditions in the
statute that were not written there by the legislature and further in adopting such
conditions have literally destroyed any legal significance of the phrase 'misconduct
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consistently held that a laid-off worker still occupies an employee
relationship;2 7 and (4) the claimants were not the type of persons for
whom the Indiana Employment Security Act was enacted.m
The decision of the Indiana court is unfortunate in that (1) it
tends to lend judicial approval to attempts, by "illegal" and "wild-
cat" strikes, to force premature reemployment, (2) it creates a
loophole whereby a laid-off worker can effectually circumvent the
purpose of the no-strike clause in his collective bargaining agree-
ment,2 (3) it extends the benefits of unemployment compensation to
persons who have been laid off because of their own fault.30 and (4)
it may subsequently be cited as authority for the proposition that,
regardless of the definition of "employee" in the no-strike clause, a
laid-off worker can never be disqualified from receiving unemploy-
ment benefits because of "misconduct in connection with his work."
As the dissent properly points out, this decision allows the laid-off
worker to have his cake and eat it too.3' It is submitted that the
majority erred in applying such a literal and narrow construction to
the word "employee."" Instead, the court should have considered the
purpose of the no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement,
the purpose of the unemployment compensation statute, and the
several interests of the employer, employee, and public, sought to be
served in preventing illegal and wildcat labor disputes.3 A more
realistic and logical construction is that used by the National Labor
Relations Board.M That test is whether the laid-off workers have a
reasonable expectation of reemployment in the near future. Applying
that test to the instant case, it appears obvious that the claimants
were still "employees" of their former employer because (1) they
retained their seniority rights and rights of recall until such time as
the appellant was in a position to reemploy them, (2) they attempted
to force their premature reemployment, thereby recognizing and
claiming their status as employees under the collective bargaining
in connection with his work' except in concurrence with the above three conditions."
Id. at 40.
27. Cases cited note 19 supra.
28. "It seems obvious that but for their 'misconduct' during 'lay off' they would still
be employed and this being true their 'misconduct' could logically be construed to be
'in connection with (their) work' therefore it should necessarily follow that their em-
ployment was terminated 'through their own fault" and hence they are not the type
of persons referred to in the public policy of the Act and should be declared ineligible
for benefits." 191 N.E.2d at 40.
29. Note 4 supra.
30. Note 28 supra.
31. 191 N.E.2d at 41.
32. Note 22 supra.
33. See note 17 supra. The same considerations that were applied in that decision
should be considered in the decision of the instant case.
34. Note 19 supra.
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agreement, (3) they had not found other employment elsewhere in
the interim, and, most significant of all, (4) they were reemployed less
than two months after being laid off. The potential adverse significance
of this holding could be limited by defining the word "employee"
in the no-strike clause of the collective bargaining agreement to in-
clude a worker who is temporarily laid off and who has not found
other employment, or by amending the disqualifying clause of the
unemployment compensation statute to include a worker who is
temporarily laid off and who has not found other employment.
Real Property-Future Interests-Valuation of
Possibility of Reverter
The owner of an undivided one-fifth' of a possibility of reverter
sought to share in the proceeds from the condemnation of the de-
terninable fee.2 The court disallowed his claim on the grounds that
the possibility of reverter was valueless since a breach of the condition
was not imminent.3 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
held, affirmed, without prejudice to the owner of the possibility of
reverter to file for a further hearing on the basis of the new rule
established by this case. A possibility of reverter is a compensable
interest and is, at least, entitled to nominal damages when the land
is condemned; if a breach of the condition is imminent or the fair
market value of the land when applied to its best practical use exceeds
the value of its restricted use, the owner of the possibility of reverter
is entitled to a proportion of the condemnation award the denominator
of which is the fair market value of the land applied to its best practi-
cal use and the numerator of which is the difference between that
value and the value of the restricted use.m 4 State v. Independent School
District No. 31, 123 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1963).
1. The owner of the determinable fee had previously acquired quitclaim deeds from
the owners of the other undivided four-fifths of the possibility of reverter. State v.
Independent School District No. 31, 123 N.W.2d 121, 124 n.1 (Minn. 1963).
2. The parcel of land in question was restricted to use as an athletic field and
playground for children who attended the school of the owner of the determinable fee.
123 N.W.2d at 123.
3. The trial court found that at the time of the condemnation proceeding the parcel
of land was being used as an athletic field and that there was no intent to abandon
the land or to put it to any other use. 123 N.W.2d at 125.
4. "Illustration 1. Assume: A. Reasonable market value of the land if applied to
highest and best use ...... .............. $100,000
B. Reasonable market value of land if used as a high school athletic field for such
period as continued use for that purpose is reasonably to be anticipated . . $75,000
Ratio by which distribution of award is made is 1:3, with 4 of the award payable to
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Under the general rule the owner of a possibility of reverter is not
entitled to share in the proceeds from the condemnation of the de-
terminable fee.5 The reasons generally given for this rule are that a
possibility of reverter is not an estate but a mere expectancy,6 that
compliance with the condition is made impossible and, therefore,
excused by condemnation,7 and that any valuation of a possibility of
reverter must necessarily be speculative and contingent.8 These reasons
have been severely criticized by legal writers. In view of the weak-
ness of these reasons, the drafters of the Restatement of Property pro-
vided an exception to the general rule. The exception was designed
to alleviate the situation in which the operation of the general rule
is most objectionable, i.e., when the future interest is about to become
a present possessory interest due to an imminent breach of the con-
dition. Under the Restatement rule if a breach of the condition is
imminent "within a reasonably short period of time,"' 0 the condemna-
tion award is to be divided between the owners of the possibility of
reverter and the determinable fee in such manner "as fairly represents
the proportionate value"" of each interest. In accordance with a dis-
cernible trend to allow future interests to share in the condemnation
award,'12 a number of courts have adopted the Restatement rule in
owner of the possibility of reverter and 3A to the owner of the fee simple determinable.
Illustration 2. Assume the value determined under (A) above is $75,000 or less and the
value under (B) above remains the same. In such event the owner of the determinable
fee would be entitled to the entire award minus an allowance to the owner of the
possibility of reverter for nominal damages." 123 N.W.2d at 130 n.11.
5. See, e.g., Woodville v. United States, 152 F.2d 735 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 842 (1946); Beard's Erie Basin, Inc. v. New York, 142 F.2d 487 (2d Cir.
1944); Puerto Rico v. United States, 132 F.2d 220 (1st Cir. 1942); United States v.
1119.15 Acres of Land, 44 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. II. 1942); Chandler v. Jamaica Pond
Aqueduct Corp., 125 Mass. 544 (1854); Lyford v. City of Laconia, 75 N.H. 220, 72 Atl.
1085 (1909); First Reformed Dutch Church v. Crowell, 210 App. Div. 294, 206 N.Y.
Supp. 132 (1924); 2 NicHoLs, Enmm DomAiN § 5.221 (3d ed. 1950); 81 A.L.R.2d
568 (1962). For a discussion of the general topic see Browder, The Condemnation of
Future Interests, 48 VA. L. REv. 461 (1962); Stoyles, Condemnation of Future Interests,
43 IowA L. REv. 241 (1958).
6. See Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., supra note 5, at 547.
7. See Woodville v. United States, supra note 5, at 738.
8. See Beard's Erie Basin, Inc. v. New York, supra note 5, at 489.
9. The writers point out that although the possibility of reverter may not technically
be an estate in land, it still has value. And this value is no more contingent and
speculative than the value of a right of inchoate dower, which has been valuated in
condemnation by several courts. Furthermore, to say that condemnation makes com-
pliance with the condition impossible is but a play on words; it could as easily be
said that condemnation makes the possibility of reverter unenforceable. Browder, supra
note 5, at 472-73; Stoyles, supra note 5, at 247-53.
10. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 53 comment c (1936).
11. Ibid.
12. See, e.g., Brugh v. White, 267 Ala. 575, 103 So. 2d 800 (1957) (remainderman);




cases dealing with the rights of the owner of the possibility of re-
verter.'3 However, only a few courts in applying the rule have found
that a breach of the condition was imminent, and only one court has
attempted to apportion the condemnation award between the two
interests.14
In the instant case the court held that a possibility of reverter is
always compensable when a determinable fee is condemned. Since
in Minnesota a possibility of reverter is alienable, 5 the court held
that this type of future interest is protected by the provision of the
state constitution that the state may not take property without com-
pensation.16 For this reason the owner of the possibility of reverter
must at least be given nominal damages; and, if a breach of the con-
dition is imminent, he must receive substantial damages. Furthermore,
since the basis for the condemnation award is the fair market value of
the land applied to its best practical use,' 7 the court reasoned that if
the value of the land in its restricted use were less than the best use
value, the owner of the determinable fee would receive a windfall if
he were allowed the entire condemnation award. Therefore, in this
situation, the owner of the possibility of reverter is entitled to sub-
stantial damages even if a breach of the condition is not imminent.
Substantial damages are to be determined by the use of a ratio which
is based on the relative values of the best practical use and the re-
stricted use.' 8 The result of the ratio in the normal situation is that
the owner of the possibility of reverter receives any excess of the
condemnation award over the value of the restricted use.
The instant case is significant for three reasons. First, it recognizes
that a possibility of reverter is compensable and at least entitled to
nominal damages when the determinable fee is condemned. Second,
it establishes an additional situation in which the possibility of re-
verter is entitled to substantial damages-when the best use value
of the land is greater than its restricted use value. And, third, it
13. See, e.g., United States v. 16 Acres of Land, 47 F. Supp. 603 (D. Mass. 1942);
United States v. 2184.81 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 681 (W.D. Ark. 1942); City
of Santa Monica v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 2d 463, 232 P.2d 55 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951);
Chew v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 307, 161 A.2d 621 (1960).
14. United States v. 2184.81 Acres of Land, supra note 13. The court gave the
building to the owner of the determinable fee and the land to the owner of the
possibility of reverter.
15. This is the general rule. Srvms, FuTURE INTExsTs § 33 (1951).
16. MwNN. CoNsT. art. 1, § 13. The Minnesota provision is representative of similar
provisions in other state constitutions. See, e.g., Mo. CONsT. art. 1, § 26; N.Y. CoNsT.
art. 1, § 7.
17. 4 NicHOLs, EmN i~r DoAiN §§ 12.1, 12.2[1] (3d ed. 1950).
18. The court uses a ratio to insure that the proportion of the interest of the pos-
sibility of reverter will remain constant in case the value of the condemnation award




provides a rational method of measuring the value of a possibility of
reverter. The Minnesota court is correct in holding that a possibility
of reverter is compensable as a property interest when the determina-
ble fee is condemned. This harmonizes with the general recognition
of the interest as alienable and descendible. 19 Although other sug-
gestions of possible ways to protect the interest when the determinable
fee is condemned have been made,20 the court provides a rational
method of compensating the owner of the possibility of reverter. How-
ever, if a breach of the condition is not imminent, it is questionable
whether substantial damages should be allowed merely because the
condemnation award exceeds the value of the restricted use. In this
situation it is doubtful if the owner of the possibility of reverter suffers
substantial damages when the determinable fee is condemned, since
he is not deprived of a possessory estate in the near future. Although
we may expect more courts to hold that a possibility of reverter is a
compensable interest when the determinable fee is condemned, it is
doubtful that many will be willing to give the owner substantial
damages if a breach of the condition is not imminent.
Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Deductibility of
Contingent Witness Fees
Petitioner Reffett's' non-union coal mine was destroyed by fire in
1951. In 1953 he was referred to Bolling, who knew two persons who
would testify that they were hired by the United Mine Workers2 to
set the fire. After meeting with the two in Bolling's office,3 Reffett
19. Snms, FuTuRE INTERESTS §§ 33, 34 (1951).
20. A student author in 46 CORNELL L.Q. 631 (1961) suggests a similar approach
to the one taken by the court in the instant case. His suggestion is that the apportion-
ment of the condemnation award be determined by the difference in values of the two
estates at the time of the original conveyance. However, this presents a difficult
problem of determining the value of the fee simple estate. Another writer has suggested
that the respective rights be attached to a trust funded with the condemnation award
or to similar realty purchased with the condemnation award. Stoyles, supra note 5,
at 256. But it is doubtful that this type of arrangement would be acceptable to
the courts, which are not inclined to perpetuate dead hand control of property, es-
pecially if there is an equitable way of concluding the arrangement when the property
is condemned.
1. Reffett's attorney, one Boiling, was also challenging a tax deficiency determined
by the Commissioner arising out of the same transactions. The cases were consolidated
for trial, but Boiling is not affected by the issue to be discussed in this note.
2. Hereinafter referred to as UMW.
3. At this meeting, the two told Reffett that they would not testify in any legal
action he might bring unless he hired Boiling as his attorney. Reffett was also told
that Boiling had in his safe the depositions of the two concerning the fire. Reffett
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signed an agreement 4 to pay each of the prospective witnesses ten
per cent of any amount he might recover in his damage suit against
the UMW in return for their services as witnesses. 5 The suit for
damages resulted in a verdict in petitioner's favor for $46,750, which
the UMW paid in 1954. In his 1954 tax return, Reffett reported a long-
term capital gain of over twelve thousand dollars from this judgment;
the remainder of the judgment was deducted as litigation expense.'
The Commissioner denied the deduction and assessed a deficiency
against Reffett. In the Tax Court of the United States, held, a deduc-
tion for contingent witness fees must be denied, as such fees are not
"ordinary" expenses within the meaning of section 162 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954; besides, the allowance of this deduction would
be violative of public policy. Sanford Reffett, 39 T.C. 869 (1963).
The deductibility of contingent witness fees under section 162 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 has not previously been decided. How-
ever, the "ordinary and necessary" requirement for deduction of busi-
ness expenses under that section has received much treatment.7 Sec-
tion 162 provides that "there shall be allowed as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year ... ." In its first definition of "ordinary and
necessary" 8 the Supreme Court held that the phrase meant an expense
"directly connected with" or one which "proximately resulted from"
a taxpayer's business.9 This did not mean that the taxpayer had to
incur the expense often in order to be able to deduct it. It meant,
rather, that an expense would be held "ordinary," even if unique to the
particular taxpayer, as long as the group of which that taxpayer was a
had not known Boiling before this meeting, but "agreed" to hire him.
4. While the court doesn't make clear whether this agreement was entered into
voluntarily, a reasonable conclusion from the facts seems to be that it was also a
requirement insisted upon by the two prospective witnesses. Judge Mulroney based
his dissent on the force placed on Reffett to agree to the fee arrangement.
5. The damage suit was litigated in Virginia which has statutory provisions for
compensation of witnesses. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-187 (Supp. 1962).
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162. While Reffett did not specifically claim the
deductions under this section, the court assumed that he was, necessarily, relying on it.
7. Since the Supreme Court has dealt extensively with the meaning of "ordinary
and necessary" within the scope of section 162, little reference will be made to lower
court decisions on this aspect of the problem. There are many law review articles on
the subject. For a recent discussion which gives a very good treatment to the question
see Comment, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems of
Sanctioning with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 108 (1962).
8. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928). An interesting fact can be
noted when the cases discussing "ordinary and necessary" are looked at together. The
Court hasn't always made a decision on the basis of an expense being both "ordinary
and necessary." This has relevance with respect to the instant case, as will be indicated
in the later discussion.
9. Id. at 153. In using these criteria, the Court was able to determine whether the
expense in question was "ordinary and necessary."
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part would incur the expense in question when faced with a similar
problem.10 The Court subsequently noted, however, that while it
might be unique to the taxpayer, the expense, to be "ordinary," had
to be such that "the transaction which gives rise to it . . . . [is] of
common or frequent occurence in the type of business involved.""
Thereafter, the Court, in several cases, 2 suggested that public policy
might be a relevant consideration in interpreting the "ordinary and
necessary" requirement governing the deduction of business ex-
penses. 13 Restrictions were placed, however, on the type of public
policy that could be used in disallowing a deduction, should it other-
wise be "ordinary and necessary."14 Thus, the deduction would have to
"frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing par-
ticular types of conduct"'15 and "the policies frustrated must be na-
tional or state policies evidenced by some governmental declaration"
6
before the deduction would be disallowed on the grounds of public
policy. In Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 7 the Court de-
cided that if allowance of a deduction would frustrate some state or
national public policy "a finding of necessity cannot be made."
18
10. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). In this case, the Court assumed the
"necessity" of the expense and decided the case by discussing what "ordinary" meant.
This discussion gave rise to the "uniqueness" test. Of course, the Code requirement
that the expense be "ordinary and necessary" means that the expense must be both
"ordinary" and "necessary." Id. at 113.
11. Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940). This case is particularly interesting,
as the Court decided the deductibility of the expense both on the Kornhauser v. United
States, supra note 8, and the Welch v. Helvering, supra note 10, tests, implying that
"ordinary" meant something in addition to "ordinary and necessary."
12. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1950); Commissioner v. Heininger, 320
U.S. 467 (1943). In both these cases the Court talked only about the expenses
involved being "ordinary and necessary."
13. The cases concerned predecessors of section 162 of the 1954 Code; these were
section 23(a) of the Revenue Acts of 1936 and 1938 and section 23(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939. The substantive portion of these sections, as far as this note
is concerned, was identical. Thus, section 23(a)(1) (A) of the 1939 Code provided
that in computing net income there would be allowed as deductions "all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business ...."
14. As has been pointed out, the criterion of public policy as affecting deductibility
is one of judicial origin. 1 RABKIN & JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE
TAXATION § 3.11 (1962).
15. Commissioner v. Heininger, supra note 12, at 473.
16. Lilly v. Commissioner, supra note 12, at 96. As to the problems concerning
what constitutes a "governmental declaration" see Schwartz, Business Expenses Con-
trary to Public Policy: An Evaluation of the Lilly Case, 8 TAx L. REv. 241 (1953).
There was some feeling of relief that the Court did not find a controlling public policy
in either of these cases. This was taken to mean that the Court would not be too
concerned with the argument of public policy in the future. Id. at 249.
17. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
18. Id. at 33. Without spelling out a complete explanation, the Court here seemed
to put the whole question of public policy in context. Thus, presumably, courts would
have to consider whether a particular expense violated public policy and, if it did,
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While the Court retained the requirement of a governmental declara-
tion, it seemed to broaden the possible scope of that declaration 19
by noting that
the test of nondeductibility always is the severity and immediacy of the
frustration resulting from allowance of the deduction. The flexibility of such
a standard is necessary if we are to accommodate both the congressional in-
tent to tax only net income and the presumption against congressional intent
to encourage violation of declared public policy.20
This point raises the important question of the policies, if any, of
states concerning contingent witness fee arrangements. Declarations
of such policies by the legislatures themselves are nonexistent; 21 how-
ever, state courts have dealt extensively with the question. Generally,
any agreement to pay a witness a fee above the statutory allowance
has been held void as violative of public policy.22 Witness fees con-
tingent on the outcome of the litigation are held to be especially bad,
for they tend to "contaminate the stream of justice at its source. It
can admit neither of doubt or question, that both morality and sound
policy forbid the toleration of such contracts as this."23 Other courts
use similar strong language in condemning such agreements, and this
doctrine early became the uniform rule in this country.24
The Tax Court in the instant case dismissed the Commissioner's
finding that the expenses "were not 'ordinary and necessary,' principal-
ly because they were violative of public policy," noting that the
Commissioner had not proved that the public policy of Virginia was
against contingent witness fees. The court, in passing, did agree that
public policy was as stated by the Commissioner, but went on to deny
the deduction "on more basic grounds; namely, because they were
not 'ordinary' within the meaning of section 162."26 In doing so, the
court concluded that the expenses were not "ordinary" because they
to hold that it was not "necessary." Necessarily, therefore, an expense could not then
be deducted under section 162.
19. At no time has the Court held that the "governmental declaration" must be a
statute. In fact the Court expressly disavowed decision of that point. Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 34 n.6. Furthermore, language in the case
implies that something other than a statute would be sufficient to meet the requirement
of a "governmental declaration." Id. at 35.
20. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 19, at 35. For an especially
strong criticism of basing tax policy on moral considerations see Reid, Disallowance of
Tax Deductions on Grounds of Public Policy-A Critique, 17 FED. BJ. 575 (1957).
21. It might be said that the statute fixing witness fees in Virginia indicates
legislative intent to forbid contingent witness fees. See note 5 supra.
22. Dodge v. Stiles, 26 Conn. 463 (1857).
23. Dawkins v. Gill, 10 Ala. 206, 208 (1846).
24. Perry v. Dicken, 105 Pa. 83 (1884); Bowling v. Blum, 52 S.W. 97 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1899).
25. 39 T.C. 869, 877.
26. Id. at 878.
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were not only unique to Reffett, but were also "not in our experience
the common and accepted means used by a coal operator or any other
person in prosecuting an action for damages to his business. 12 7 Having
"decided" the issue, the court, "for completeness, but without elabora-
tion,"28 discussed public policy and found that such fee agreements
violated public policy. The court, citing one of its earlier cases,2 9 found
that, had it based its decision on the violation of public policy, the
governmental declaration required for a denial of the deduction did
exist in this case.
The Tax Court's treatment of this case indicates the uncertainty still
plaguing the courts about the relative weight, if any, to be given
public policy in making a determination of "ordinary and necessary,
under section 162.30 The court here tried to avoid deciding the case
on the basis of public policy; rather, it "decided" that the expenses
were not "ordinary" as they were unique not only to Reffett, but would
also be unique to the group of which he was a part.3' Having thus
decided the issue, the court threw in the argument of public policy,
almost as an afterthought. However, under the criterion set out by
the Supreme Court in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,2 the
Tax Court here should have based its finding, if not solely, at least
jointly on the grounds of the expense not being "necessary," there
being an overriding public policy against allowing contingent witness
fees. Yet, mere criticism of the Tax Court's decision of one case does
not warrant a great deal of attention; the hesitation of the Tax Court
to base its decision squarely on the grounds of public policy might
better prompt an examination of the place of such considerations in
cases arising under section 162. Unfortunately, much that has been
written on the question concludes that, because of the difficulty sur-
rounding the matter, public policy considerations should be dropped,33
A more realistic analysis34 would attempt to formulate bases for the de-
cision of such cases. The first question is, of course, how public policy
is to be determined in a given case. Statutess and judicial decisions
27. ibid.
28. Id. at 879.
29. Luther M. Richey, Jr., 33 T.C. 272 (1959).
30. Comment, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems of
Sanctioniing with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 109-10 nn.4-12 (1962).
31. This being true, they were not deductible under the test of Welch v. Helvering,
supra note 10.
32. 356 U.S. 30 (1958). See note 18 supra.
33. Reid, supra note 20.
34. Realistic if only because the courts, especially the Supreme Court, have con-
tinued to base decisions on public policy in the face of adverse commentary. Perhaps
the most notable example was the decision of Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,
supra note 32, coming almost on the heels of Mr. Reid's strong critique of public
policy as a criterion under section 162. Reid, supra note 20.
35. However, one court recently held that a Mississippi statute prohibiting traffic
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naturally are of substantial value, the latter especially when uniform.
Administrative rulings, while farther down the scale of authority,
might be taken into account, at least where a statutory or judicially
declared policy can not be found. A major criticism of using public
policy as a criterion is met when the relevant policy is found. When
that problem is solved, however, a far more difficult one, and one that
seems not yet to have been discussed, would arise if there were found
conflicting national and state policies in an area. To ask the question
might seem to be to answer it, but perhaps the obvious answer-
that the national policy would preempt that of the state-would be
misleading in this case. 6 It should not be axiomatic that merely to
find a national policy in an area would be to supersede a state policy
in the same area. An attempt to balance the interests involved should
be made to determine which interests should be dominant in a given
situation. While the various balances which could be struck im-
mediately suggest answers, the solution would not be a panacea.
However, it does seem preferable to the solution which would merely
dismiss the problem as being unwieldy. Most critics of the process
of considering public policy in determining "ordinary and necessary"
problems under section 162 point out that it is impossible to state a
rule for determining public policy and the weight to be given to it in
any particular case. Although this is true, the difficulty in weighing
the interests involved would be worthwhile if effect can be given to
the policies of both federal taxation and governmental declarations
in other areas. In view of the fact that the courts have ignored such
critics, it seems that this solution should be given a fuller, and more
understanding, consideration.
in alcoholic beverages within that state did not set the public policy of that state with
respect to liquor, since the state, as well as local governments, derived a sizeable
amount of revenue from the taxation of such traffic as did take place within the state.
The court allowed as an "ordinary and necessary" business expense a deduction for
whisky purchased in the state for distribution to customers. Stacy v. United States,
CCH 1963 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (63-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) ff 9746 (S.D. Miss. July 30,
1963). Furthermore, even when a statute ostensibly sets a policy, a problem can
arise as to which of several possibly conflicting policies was intended to be adopted.
This is where any decisions interpreting the statute would be particularly helpful.
36. Thus, a court, with reasoning akin to the rationale of Stacy v. United States,
supra note 35, could easily decide that a particular federal policy was not definitive
enough to override a strongly defined state policy in a given case.
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Torts-Warranty-Relation of Foreseeability of Risk
to the Implied Warranty of a Cigarette Manufacturer
The widow and the administrator of the estate of a lung cancer
victim brought a consolidated' diversity suit in the District Court for
the Southern District of Florida2 against a cigarette manufacturer,
alleging that the use of the manufacturer's product was a proximate
cause of the decedent's lung cancer. The case went to the jury on
two of the plaintiffs' six theories of liability3-breach of implied war-
ranty and negligence. The jury returned a general verdict for the
defendant based on its special finding that the cigarette manufacturer
could not reasonably have known that the use of its product created
a risk of lung cancer.4 The judgment for defendant was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, one judge dissenting.5
Upon petition for hearing, the court of appeals certified to the
Supreme Court of Florida the question whether under Florida law
strict liability would be imposed on a cigarette manufacturer in such
a case, even though the manufacturer could not reasonably have
known of the risk of lung cancer to smokers.6 The Florida Supreme
1. The widow sued under the Wrongful Death Statute. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 768.01-
.02 (1959). The administrator's action was substituted for a prior action instituted by
the decedent under the Survival Statute. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.11 (1959). These
actions were consolidated for trial by order'of the federal district -court.
2. Choate, Emett C., J. (no opinion published).
3. Plaintiffs' original theories were: (1) breach of implied warranty; (2) breach
of express warranty; (3) negligence; (4) misrepresentation; (5) battery; and (6)
violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as
amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1958); Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat.
717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1958); Florida Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 500.01-.45 (1959). Defendant's motion for directed verdict
was granted as to theories (2), (4), (5), and (6). Plaintiffs did not appeal these
rulings or the findings on the negligence count.
4. The jury was given four special interrogatories under FED.'R. Civ. P. 49(b).
"'(1) Did the decedent Green have primary cancer in his left lung? .... [Yes.] ....
(2) Was the cancer in his left lung the cause or one of the causes of his death?
.... [Yes.] . . . . (3) Was the smoking of Lucky Strike cigarettes on the part of
the decedent, Green, a proximate cause or one of the proximate causes of the de-
velopment of cancer in his left lung? .... [Yes.] .... (4) Could the defendant on,
or prior to, February 1, 1956, by the reasonable application of human skill and
foresight have known that users of Lucky Strike cigarettes, such as the decedent
Green would be endangered, by the inhalation of the main stream smoke from Lucky
Strike cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung? .... .. [No.] '" Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 71-72 (5th Cir. 1962).
5. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
6. The exact question certified was: "Does the law of Florida impose on a manu-
facturer and distributor of cigarettes absolute liability, as for breach of implied war-
ranty, for death caused by using such cigarettes from 1924 or 1925 until February
1, 1956, the cancer having developed prior to February 1, 1956, and the death
occurring February 25, 1958, when the defendant manufacturer and distributor could
not on, or prior to, February 1, 1956, by the reasonable application of human skill
1963]
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Court held, the question should be answered in the affirmative. An
unforeseeable injury to a consumer resulting from reasonable use of
cigarettes constitutes a breach of implied warranty for which the
cigarette manufacturer is strictly liable. Green v. American Tobacco
Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
Early in the development of the common law, the tort concept of
liability without fault was applied to the sale of goods;7 the mere
sale of goods was held to imply that the seller warranted his product
to be reasonably fit for the purpose intended.8 However, due to the
contractual nature of sales, recovery under implied warranty was
available only to persons in privity of contract with the party against
whom recovery was being sought.9 The privity requirement created
few hardships to consumers until the advent of the modern whole-
saler-retailer system of product distribution, which eliminated the
privity between the consumer and the manufacturer. ° Deprived of
his action in implied warranty by the lack of privity, the consumer
who was injured by a defect in the product, in order to recover from
the manufacturer, was required to prove that the defect was caused
by the manufacturer's negligence." Recoveries in negligence were
rare because consumers usually were not in a position to obtain
enough evidence to prove either negligence of the manufacturer
or causation.12 The courts, realizing that the law of negligence did
not provide an adequate remedy in these situations, created an
exception to the requirement of privity in actions based on implied
warranty when the goods involved were intended for human con-
sumption.13 Although about half of the states have not yet abol-
and foresight, have known that users of such cigarettes would be endangered, by the
inhalation of the main stream smoke from such cigarettes, of contracting cancer of
the lung?" 304 F.2d at 86. This procedure is authorized by the Florida Certification
Statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1959). Florida is the only state authorizing such
a certification procedure and it has been used only once prior to the instant case. For
approval of this procedure, see Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960).
For criticism, see Note, 21 LA. L. REV. 777, 781 (1961), suggesting that certification
leads to deciding cases in a piecemeal fashion, shading the answer by framing the
issues in the abstract, and removing the legal problem from its factual context. See
also Moore & Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in Federal Appellate
Procedure, 35 VA. L. REv. 1 (1949) (discussing the reluctance of the Supreme
Court to consider certified questions).
7. PaossEa, ToRTs § 83 (2d ed. 1955).
8. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. Rrv. 117,
138 (1943).
9. 1 FRum & FRIEDMAN, PRODuCTs LIABLrrY § 16.03[1] (1961).
10. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
1 FRUMmEI & F=UDmAN, PRoDuCTs LABiLrry § 16.03 n.1 (1961).
11. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Assault].
12. See 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTs LIABnTY § 5 (1961); 2 HARPER &
JAmzs, TORTS § 28.1 (1956); PRossER, TORTS § 84 (2d ed. 1955).
13. See Prosser, The Assault, at 1107-08.
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ished the privity requirement where such products are concerned,
it has been held in the great majority of recent cases that a manu-
facturer of products for human consumption is liable under the
law of implied warranty to a consumer who is not in privity with
the manufacturer.' 4 Since tobacco, including cigarettes, had been
long considered a product for human consumption, 5 it was apparent
that the studies correlating lung cancer with smoking16 would lead
to a suit by a lung cancer victim against a cigarette manufacturer
under the law of implied warranty. Prior to the first cigarette-cancer
case in 1957, there existed three possible barriers to recovery against
a cigarette manufacturer under implied warranty: lack of privity of
contract; 17 lack of proof sufficient to establish a causal relationship
between smoking and lung cancer; 18 and lack of an implied warranty
broad enough in scope to include the risk of lung cancer.' 9 The
privity barrier was involved in the first cigarette-cancer case, Cooper
v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co."20 where the consumer's warranty
count was dismissed due to lack of privity with the defendant manu-
facturer. However, lack of privity has not been a barrier in subsequent
cigarette-cancer cases2' since they have all been brought in jurisdic-
tions in which there is no requirement of privity when the product
involved is intended for human consumption. The causation barrier
was breached in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.2 where
the court, in remanding the case for jury trial, held that sufficient
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962) (list-
ing approximately 25 states which have abandoned the privity rule). But see DE-
FENSE RESEARCH INsTrruTE, INC., PRODuCTs LiABnmrry 21-23 (monograph series)
(listing only 16 states as having abandoned the privity rule).
15. See, e.g., De Lape v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 25 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.
Cal. 1939), aft'd, 109 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1940); Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918).
16. See studies cited in Brumfield, Liability of Tobacco Industry: Cancer and its
Relationship to Smoking-Is it Actionable, in TRIAL & TORT TRENDS 1-12 (Belli ed.
1958).
17. See note 9 supra. But see Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St.
244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
18. See Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 294 (3d Cir.
1961) (at district court level plaintiff required to prove causation first).
19. Compare 26 ALBANY L. REv. 354, 358 (1962), 50 CALIF. L. Rtv. 566, 568-69
(1962), and 63 CoLUmt. L. REv. 515, 535 (1963) (cigarettes merchantable), with Rossi,
The Cigarette-Cancer Problem: Plaintiff's Choice of Theories Explored, 34 So. CAL.
L. REv. 399, 410-11 (1961) (cigarettes unmerchantable).
20. 158 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 875 (1958).
21. But see Ross v. Philip Morris Co., 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958) (war-
ranty count dismissed due to lack of privity), modified, Civil No. 9494, W.D. Mo., Oct.
22, 1959 (warranty count reinstated following a Missouri Supreme Court ruling that
privity was no longer required); Midwest Game Co. v. M. F. A. Milling Co., 320
S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959).
22. 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
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evidence had been introduced to sustain a jury finding that the
smoking of the manufacturer's cigarettes was a proximate cause of
the plaintiff's lung cancer.2 3 By way of dictum, the majority of the
Pritchard court attempted to dispose of the third barrier by defining
the scope of the cigarette manufacturer's implied warranty to be the
production and sale of cigarettes "reasonably fit and generally in-
tended for smoking without causing physical injury."24 However, the
concurring judge did not agree to any extension of the scope of the
implied warranty beyond the earlier common-law requirement that
the defendant's product be as safe and well-made as competing
products in the market.25 A third definition of the scope of the
implied warranty, which constituted a compromise between the two
definitions adopted in the Pritchard case, was formulated in Lartigue
v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,26 where the court held that strict
liability was imposed only for a defective condition not contemplated
by the consumer, the harmful consequences of which, based on the
existing state of human knowledge, were foreseeable by the manu-
facturer.
In the principal case, the federal district court, in determining the
scope of the implied warranty, reached the same result as that
subsequently taken in Lartigue 7 The court of appeals affirmed by
finding a "foreseeability-of-the-risk" requirement from a synthesis of
the Florida implied warranty cases.2 The Florida cases seemed to
impose liability based on the superior position of the manufacturer
to know the nature of its product. These cases, however, did not deal
with injuries resulting from unforeseeable risks, but rather with
unknown and/or undiscernable specific defects which caused a fore-
seeable injury.29 This lack of any clear-cut precedent in Florida, 0
23. Id. at 296. See also 2 WmmonE, EVIDENCE §§ 662-63 (3d ed. 1940).
24. 295 F.2d at 296 (dictum).
25. Id. at 302. Accord, Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal. 2d 190, 293
P.2d 26 (1956) (cement causing bums held merchantable). Contra, Twombley v.
Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 158 A.2d 110 (1960) (spot remover causing hepatitis
held unmerchantable). See also UNIFORM SALES AcT §§ 15(1), (2); UNIFORM CoIM-
MERcIL CODE §§ 2-314 to -315; 1 FRumER & FRIEDMAN, PnODucTs LABmILaY §
16.03[4] [a] n.14.5 (Supp. 1962).
26. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
27. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 72 (5th Cir. 1962).
28. Id. at 73-76.
29. ibid.
30. It was unfortunate that Florida had not considered any allergy cases, which
present an analogous problem under the law of implied warranty. The courts have in
such cases adopted a principle similar in nature to that established in Lartiguc. In
order to recover against the manufacturer, a consumer who is injured by his allergic
reaction to the manufacturer's product must be in an appreciable group of potential
users who would suffer the same consequences. This effectively limits the scope of the
manufacturer's implied warranty by the same considerations used by courts in de-
termining the scope of the duty to be imposed in negligence actions. See, e.g., Crotty
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coupled with the dissent by Judge Cameron, persuaded the court of
appeals to certify the question to the Florida Supreme Court for a
ruling on the correctness of the synthesis of Florida decisions. The
Florida court, rejecting both the Lartigue decision on the scope of
implied warranty and the synthesis by the court of appeals, reasoned
that the manufacturer's knowledge, or ability to know, of a risk of
injury was no more necessary to the imposition of liability than the
knowledge, or ability to know, of a specific defect in the product.
31
Actual safety is the only standard in Florida for determining the
merchantability of a product for human consumption.3
The ruling by the Florida Supreme Court is neither supported by
its precedents nor in accord with the principles underlying the exten-
sion of implied warranty to consumers. There is a difference between
the process of ascertaining the risks within the scope of an implied
warranty and the process of imposing liability for a subsequent
manifestation of the actual risks.' s The court failed to recognize this
difference when it applied the rationale developed in the food re-
tailer cases to the instant situation. In the retailer cases the risk of
the injury incurred by the consumer was obviously one against which
the law required sellers to warrant; retailers sought to escape liability
for these foreseeable injuries by showing that the presence of the
defects in the sealed products was unknown and undiscoverable.
The Florida courts correctly held that the retailers' lack of knowledge
would not exempt them from liability. However, the purpose of
implied warranty is not to render the manufacturer the complete
insurer of its product, but rather to afford to the consumers a certainty
of recovery for those injuries which were reasonably attendant to
the business conducted by the manufacturer. If the manufacturer of
products for human consumption is to be held strictly liable for any
breach of implied warranty, it is only fair that the manufacturer have
v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 467, 162 A.2d 513, 516 (1960);
Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., 320 Mass. 469, 473, 19 N.E.2d 697, 699 (1939).
See also Esborg v. Bailey, 61 Wash. 2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963), holding that a
plaintiff must show that such an ingredient is harmful to a reasonably foreseeable and
appreciable class of potential users of the product.
31. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1963). The Florida
court purports not to reach the issue of the scope of the warranty; however, a ruling
on an unforeseeable risk must go to the scope of the warranty. For an opposing view,
see Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TanAs L. REv. 856, 868-73 (1963).
32. 154 So. 2d at 172.
33. See notes 19 and 25 supra.
34. Following the decision by the Florida Supreme Court in the instant case, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court judgment for de-
fendant American Tobacco Co. The case was remanded to the district court on the
issue of reasonableness-that is, whether the cigarettes were reasonably fit and whole-
some. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963).
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some means of ascertaining the extent of its warranty. The ruling
by the Florida court allows the science of tomorrow to set the scope
of the warranty implied today. Admittedly, the scope of the war-
ranty to be imposed on manufacturers presents a difficult problem
which has not received much attention by the courts; however, it
is suggested that the approach taken by the Lartigue court presents
a fair solution since it provides recovery to the consumer for the
vast majority of his injuries while protecting the manufacturer from
a possibly crushing retroactive burden of unforeseeable liability. The
Lartigue approach expresses the volitional-fault basis of all modern
liability, since the cigarette industry is given the choice of continuing
business with this added risk of liability or of transferring its assets
to another field without having its funds greatly impaired by the
unforeseen liability. Lartigue also insures the owners of other busi-
nesses that the risks of their enterprises are only those that can
be reasonably foreseen, that is, what is foreseeable on the basis of
knowledge existing at the time of the sale.
Unfair Competition-Secondary Meaning and
Functionality in the Shape of Cigarette Lighters
Plaintiff Zippo, a well-known manufacturer of cigarette lighters,
began marketing its standard lighters in 1932 and obtained a patent
therefor in 1936. The Zippo lighter marketed today differs from the
patented one in only a few details, the most important of which is a
change from severely square comers and straight lines to rounded
corners and beveled edges. Zippo today produces more units than any
other domestic manufacturer of lighters (over 3,180,000 in 1958), and
since 1949 the company has spent at least 500,000 dollars a year on
advertising. Defendant Rogers in 1957 began importing and selling
Japanese lighters very similar to the Zippo in size, shape, and appear-
ance. In 1958 Rogers sold between 240,000 and 360,000 of these
lighters. The name "Rogers" is stamped prominently on the bottom of
the case of the defendant's lighters and also appears on the display
cards used to market the lighters. Zippo brought an action in federal
district court for trademark infringement and unfair competition
against Rogers, seeking damages and injunctive relief restraining
Rogers from marketing the Japanese lighters. Zippo, after commence-
ment of the suit, conducted an extensive consumer survey to support
its contentions that secondary meaning had been established for its
lighter and that confusion existed among buyers as to the source of
the Rogers lighter. The survey, conducted by an independent market
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research firm, resulted in findings to the effect that: (a) 42.6 per cent
of the persons surveyed, when shown an unmarked Zippo lighter,
were "certain" the lighter was a Zippo; (b) when offered the choice
between a clearly marked Zippo lighter and a clearly marked Rogers
lighter, 66.9 per cent of those surveyed took the Zippo; and (c) when
shown a clearly marked Rogers lighter, 34.7 per cent of those surveyed
thought it was a Zippo. As further proof of confusion, Zippo showed
that 191 Rogers lighters had been returned to Zippo for repair. Held,
judgment for the defendant. Even though a manufacturer shows that
the shape of its product has acquired a secondary meaning, if that
particular shape is functional it may be copied by a competitor so
long as the competitor takes reasonable steps to inform the buyer that
its product is not made by the original manufacturer. Zippo Manu-
facturing Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
Secondary meaning is essentially an association made in the mind
of the buyer between a product and the maker of that product.' The
criteria required to establish secondary meaning, as that concept is
applied to the features of an innovating producer's goods, were first
authoritatively imposed upon the law of unfair competition by Judge
Learned Hand in Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co.2 For a
plaintiff to successfully maintain an action for unfair competition
against a copyist of his goods, he must show: (1) the appearance of
his goods has become associated in the buyer's mind with the source
of those goods; (2) the buyer cares who makes the goods and to some
extent is motivated to purchase them because of the maker; (3) the
copied feature is non-functional; and (4) the buyer is likely to be-
lieve the copyist's goods come from the first producer and is thus
likely to be deceived as to their source.3 These requirements have
been adopted by other courts4 and by the Restatement of Torts.5 The
1. Nnis, UNFAIM COMPETITION AND TRADE-MmKS § 37, at 154 (4th ed. 1947).
The modem doctrine of secondary meaning has its roots, as does most of the modem
law of unfair competition, in the English common law concept of passing off. This
concept, in essence, was that one trader or craftsman could not falsely represent that
his goods were made by, or came from, another trader or craftsman and thereby be
unjustly enriched by the use of the other party's name or mark. 1 Nnms, op. cit. supra
§2.
2. 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
3. Id. at 300.
4. See, e.g., Vaughn Novelty Mfg. Co. v. G. G. Greene Mfg. Co., 202 F.2d 172
(3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953); Zangerle & Peterson Co. v.
Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1943); American Fork
& Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp., 125 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1942); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Manners
Jewelers, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. La. 1960); Columbus Plastic Prods., Inc. v.
Rona Plastic Corp., 111 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Squeezit Corp. v. Plastic
Dispensers, Inc., 31 N.J. Super. 217, 106 A.2d 322 (1954).
5. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 741 (1938).
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requirements of secondary meaning represent the courts' attempts, by
means of a rather formal and inflexible test, to balance the public
interest in not being deceived as to the source of the goods it wishes
to buy with the public interest in maintaining competition between
rival producers of the same product. These requirements are difficult
for a plaintiff to meet because the courts have traditionally demanded
convincing evidence that consumer confusion exists before granting
an injunction which gives the first producer a perpetual monopoly
over the feature copied by his competitor.6 Whether the test of
secondary meaning as propounded by Judge Hand would be strictly
applied in the Second Circuit today is a question of some doubt. Two
recent Second Circuit decisions7 have reaffirmed these requirements,
yet three relevant decisions8 appear to have dispensed with the strin-
gent requirements of secondary meaning.9 Judge Moore, in Norwich
Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug Co.,10 attempts to distinguish these
three cases by explaining that the Oneida and Flint cases involved
"actual deception," and that Mastercrafters involved "actual confusion,
palming-off, and intent to deceive." These cases, representing a re-
treat from the uncompromising application of the secondary meaning
test, cannot be dismissed so easily. This is particularly true of the
Mastercrafters decision, which appears to be in conflict with the
Crescent Tool case and can be justified only upon some theory of
misappropriation."
The court in the instant case accepted the secondary meaning re-
quirements'" as articulated in Crescent Tool 3 and section 741 of the
Restatement of Torts. After examining the results of Zippo's consumer
6. Stern & Hoffman, Public Injury and the Public Interest: Secondary Meaning in
the Law of Unfair Competition, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 935 (1962).
7. Hygienic Specialties Co. v. H. G. Salzman, Inc., 302 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1962);
American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1960).
8. Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches,
Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955); Flint v. Oleet Jewelry
Mfg. Co., 133 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Oneida, Ltd. v. National Silver Co., 25
N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
9. The court in Mastercrafters enjoined defendant from copying the design of
plaintiff's clock and selling such copies at a lower price. The court avoided the issue
of secondary meaning and based its holding upon the theory that visitors in the homes
of purchasers of defendant's clocks were likely to think the clock was made by plain-
tiff and thus be confused as to the source. In the Flint case, the defendant was
enjoined from copying plaintiff's "Mustard Seed Remembrancer." The court said that
the absence of secondary meaning was unimportant, that defendant intended to create
confusion in the minds of buyers. The court in the Oneida case, in enjoining the
defendant's copying of plaintiff's silver pattern, emphasized the likelihood of confusion
and an intent on the part of the defendant to deceive buyers.
10. 271 F.2d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960).
11. Stern, Buyer Indifference and Secondary Meaning in Unfair Competition and
Trademark Cases, 32 CONN. B.J. 381, 394 (1958).
12. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
13. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., supra note 2, at 299-300.
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survey,14 the court concluded that Zippo had established a secondary
meaning for its product.15 Zippo's request for injunctive relief was
denied, however, because the copied feature of the lighter-i.e., its
shape-facilitated its inexpensive and efficient manufacture and was
thus functional. 16 The shape of Zippo's lighter could therefore law-
fully be copied so long as the defendant took reasonable steps to
eliminate the confusion of source in the minds of buyers.
17
By applying the requirements of secondary meaning to the facts of
the instant case, the court undoubtedly arrived at the correct result.
But in view of the confusion existing within the Second Circuit as
to the current status of the secondary meaning test, it would have
been desirable for the court to have articulated and balanced, or at
least recognized, the competing interests and policies present in the
case,'8 instead of mechanically applying a rule of law to a factual
situation representative of a complex area of trade regulation. Some
of the competing policies and interests which need to be recognized
and balanced in cases of this sort are: (1) plaintiff's previous pro-
tection under a patent, if any;19 (2) the public interest in preserving
free competition among rival manufacturers of the same product; (3)
permitting the ethically questionable practice of allowing a second-
comer to take a "free ride" on the innovator's advertising and good
will;2 (4) the need to protect an innovator whose unpatented product
is still in the promotional stage;2' (5) the commercial necessity of
copying certain features of the innovator's product;2 and (6) the
existence of actual consumer confusion, whether established by a
14. The court admitted the survey as evidence over the defendant's objection that it
was hearsay. The court explained that the admission was justified on either of two
grounds: (a) the answers of the people surveyed were expressions of presently existing
states of mind, attitudes, or beliefs, and such statements constitute an exception to
the hearsay rule; or (b) a necessity exists for admitting the survey because of the
inability to get other evidence of the same probative value. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers
Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
15. Id. at 688.
16. Id. at 696-97.
17. Id. at 697-98.
18. See Stem & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 944.
19. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Manners Jewelers, Inc., supra note 4, at 847-48.
20. Compare the statement of Brandeis, J., in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,
305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938), that "sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by
a patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the free
exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested," with that of Clark, J.,
dissenting in Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 422 (2d
Cir. 1952), that "much of modem advertising offends my sensibilities; on the other
hand I cannot develop enthusiasm for the manufacturer who would rely on the
advertising of others to market a poorer product, even at a lesser price."
21. Galbally, Unfair Trade in the Stimulation of Rival Goods-The Test of Com-
mercial Necessity, 3 VmL. L. Ruv. 333, 334 (1958).
22. Id. at 341.
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survey or otherwise. Had the court recognized and weighed these
competing interests, its decision would have rested upon a more per-
suasive and convincing basis.
